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
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CONCEPTS OF CONFLICT: TOWARDS A MILITARY THEORY OF CONFLICT

by

George O. Goodson, Jr.


Lieutenant Colonel, USMC

An Advanced Research Project submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: *George O. Goodson Jr.*

30 June 1973

Project directed by
Rear Admiral H. E. Eccles, USN, Ret.
Consultant, Naval War College



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THE CONTINUUM OF CONFLICT; *and (4)* THE NECESSITY FOR FORCE, *and* THE USE OF POWER AND FORCE. A TOPICAL OUTLINE OF A COMPREHENSIVE

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CONCEPTS OF CONFLICT: TOWARDS A MILITARY THEORY OF CONFLICT

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

And I saw when the Lamb opened one of the seals, and I heard, as it were the noise of thunder, one of the four beasts saying, Come and see.

And I saw, and behold a white horse: and he that set on him had a bow, and a crown was given unto him: and he went forth conquering, and to conquer.¹

War and conflict have been the lot of the American people for three decades: World War II, the Berlin blockade, Korea, Lebanon, Quemoy, Berlin...again, the Cuban Missile Crisis, Laos, the Dominican Republic, Vietnam, and many lesser involvements where the American presence was not so visible. Now it would seem a new era is upon us; an era still of conflict, but a muted conflict. The superpowers, the U.S., USSR, and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC), are apparently stressing negotiation rather than confrontation; compromise rather than implacability. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have produced limited but significant steps in arms control of intercontinental ballistic missiles and disarmament of antiballistic missiles.

The fundamental threat is, however, still present. The USSR and the PRC still continue to increase their nuclear capability; Soviet naval forces are increasing dramatically while those of the PRC, though limited, are nonetheless formidable in terms of

Asian employment; ground combat forces of both the USSR and the PRC remain stable but large and able.² Neither the USSR nor the PRC has abrogated their commitment to support "wars of national liberation."

Conflict has shifted from the center of power to the periphery. It is here on the periphery that the people of the Third World are filled with aspirations and beset by poverty. It is here on the periphery that a new and intensified spirit of nationalism is emerging. It is here on the periphery that local hegemonic powers are beginning to appear. It is here on the periphery that the major powers are maneuvering for influence. It is here on the periphery that the danger of an intensification and widening of conflict is greatest.

It is now clear that the military power of the United States has been greatly limited by the Vietnam War and its subsequent economic dislocation and domestic discord. The substantial reduction in military forces is but a part of that limitation; resolve and confidence were also casualties of the war in Vietnam. It seems highly unlikely that military force can be used in support of U. S. policy in the near future, barring overt military attack on U. S. territory or on territories where U. S. interests are unambiguously clear.

Foreign governments will quickly see the implications of this lack of resolve and confidence; extreme limitations of the U.S. will and ability to act in areas where conventional military

force may be required. This reduction in ability to respond will result in a diminishing of U.S. prestige and influence. It may also lead to a return to excessive dependency on nuclear weapons. And there lies the danger.

The Problem

It is now obvious that high level political-military decisions are more complex and have greater effect than has heretofore been realized. The problems and difficulties of human conflict are infinite and so filled with contradiction and paradox that they resist solution. The cause and effect relationship of political and military affairs is such that knowledge of both is necessary if either are to be controlled.

If reason and logic and restraint are to dominate improvisation and guess work and rashness in the approach to the political-military problems which confront this nation, then there must be an intuitive understanding of fundamental military concepts.

Such understanding is not easily achieved. There are no immutable dogmas which can be codified and stored so that one can push a button and call forth an appropriate solution when situation "A" occurs. There are, however, fundamental principles and concepts which generally hold true. These are capable of being expressed as military theory. Rear Admiral H. E. Eccles, USN, Ret., has said:

Military theory and principles can and have been expressed in terms that give a sense of structure, logic, and discipline to military study. These statements of principles can be expressed in various ways. Only when a man has viewed military problems from various perspectives and in various terms can he achieve understanding and only then can he exercise informed wisdom as he applies himself to professional practice in its infinite variety...Without an intuitive sense of structure and principle a man cannot be expected to make either a good military analysis or decision.³

The problem then is one of providing this sense of structure, logic, and discipline through the identification and development of the fundamental military concepts and principles and expressing them in a coherent military theory.

Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to build a foundation for a military theory of conflict.* This requires the identification of those basic concepts which when viewed as a coherent group provide an understanding of the nature and structure of conflict. The aim of this project is to illuminate the major elements of these concepts and to identify the military implications of those broad areas of human conflict not covered by

*A theory of conflict is but one of the basic subjects which would comprise a comprehensive military theory. Admiral H. E. Eccles, who has led all others in the study of military theory, lists eleven basic subjects which must be addressed. Each subject has basic concepts, corollaries, subordinate areas and concepts which must be identified and explored. See H. E. Eccles, "Military Theory: A Topical Structural Outline," Unpublished Paper, Naval War College, Newport, R.I.:n.d.

civilian thought and experience. It has been stated by Admiral Eccles that one function of a War College is to provide a body of ideas, well expressed, which will serve as a starting point for further study. It is hoped that this work will meet such a need.

The Need

The need for military theory has been stated but it is doubted that the need has been established for the American military professional is strangely contemptuous of history and theory. History is inseparable from theory for it is history which reveals the patterns and shows the relationships and importance of the elements of the pattern.

The American military professional does not value theory. He rarely discusses it, hardly ever reads it, and almost never writes it. This lack of perceptive writing is at once surprising and explicable.

It is surprising on the one hand, when one compares the military profession with other professions. In other professions theory is studied, written about, and relied upon: educators study and write on theories of education and devise educational schemes based on those theories; economists study and interpret the accumulated experience and propose theory as a formal guide for future actions.

On the other hand, it is understandable that the military professional would have a peculiarly professional bias against

military theory. He is by nature a practical man, oriented towards action. Throughout his career he has been judged and promoted on the basis of his skill in performing assigned tasks; not on his broad knowledge of military theory. Finally, he is so busy doing, that he has little time for the study and contemplation necessary to come to grips with military theory.

So when the military professional writes, he writes from a limited viewpoint. In his military service publications, he writes mainly on the mechanics of routine and procedure. If through chance he occupied a position of importance, he writes memoirs. Rarely is he analytical and even more rarely does he attempt to evolve historical truths to serve as a guide for future actions.

Eccles speaks to the need and significance of theory:

Theory does not pretend to solve problems: it sheds light on problems and thus can provide guidance for those who have the responsibility for solving them.

In the application of theory to a problem of life, the responsible executive must make many compromises between conflicting optimum solutions of parts of the problem. Thus, in effect, he must decide when and to what degree it is appropriate for one theoretical consideration to overbalance another. This requires experience and common sense plus a lively feeling of personal responsibility for the results of the decision.

Circumstances frequently compel political-military leaders to depart from sound theory and principles. Such departures should be made knowingly and with an understanding of probable consequences. They should not be made through ignorance or inadvertence....

It is important to recognize that a theory of war is something more than a mere description of war at a given stage. Theory does not content itself with re-tracing the factual state of affairs. Its task is to penetrate to the inner structure of warfare, to its component parts, and to their interrelations.⁴

The Approach

The foundation for a military theory of conflict is broad and varied. Since conflict is a human activity one must consider the Natural Human Origins of Conflict. This has been done briefly by considering the instinctive aggressive drives which motivate man.

International conflict is that with which the military professional is concerned so The Origins of International Conflict are examined in detail and in the light of a theory that all international conflict results from a struggle for power.

Next, The Continuum of Conflict is examined. Emphasis is placed on recognition that there is no longer a distinct period of peace and war but that there is a continuum of conflict with varying degrees of intensity. The nature of modern conflict is examined and its significant features identified.

The age-old question of The Necessity For Force is discussed in the context that much of today's military and political literature implicitly assumes that military force will not again be required on a significant scale. The origins and effects of this assumption are set forth.

The Use of Power and Force centers on two questions of significance: the primacy of political purpose in the conduct of military affairs and the relationship of military strategy to national objectives. Each is examined in detail.

The concluding chapter discusses the reasons why military theory is depreciated and reinforces the need for a comprehensive military theory. Additional areas of concern are indicated.

Appendix I sets forth a topical outline of a comprehensive theory of conflict. The reader is reminded that a theory of conflict is but one of the basic subjects which would be covered in a comprehensive military theory.

Appendix II is an examination of the military implications raised by David Halberstam's The Best and the Brightest. This appendix presents within the context of a single issue, Vietnam, many of the concepts which are fundamental to military theory.

Explicit through the paper is the concept that there is no longer a distinct line between war and peace. Eccles has noted:

...the attempt to provide brief and strict definitions of General War and Limited War tends to obscure the unpleasant reality that in many areas of human conflict, it is essential to use military force without there being any declaration or recognition of war of any sort.

In other words we have the great paradox that in order to think clearly about war and the employment of military forces we should as far as possible avoid using the word "war!"⁵

The experience of researching and preparing this paper has proven him right. Consequently, the word conflict has been used where ever possible. When it was not possible to avoid the word "war" it was used so as to differentiate between formal and legal "War" and that use of military force which is "war" by

any other name: War is that formal legal condition; war is the use of military force without legal acknowledgement.

Friedrich Nietzsche wrote in The Wanderer and His Shadow one of the most hopeful prophecies of mankind. While we who are military men must be prepared for conflict, we may share the hope expressed here:

And perhaps the great day will come when a people, distinguished by wars and victories and by the highest development of a military order and intelligence, and accustomed to make the heaviest sacrifice for these things, will exclaim of its own free will, "we break the sword" and will smash its military establishment down to its lowest foundations. Rendering oneself unarmed when one has been the best armed, out of a height of feeling--that is the means to real peace, which must always rest on a peace of mind; whereas the so-called armed peace as it now exists in all countries, is the absence of peace of mind. One trusts neither oneself nor one's neighbor and, half from hatred, half from fear, does not lay down arms. Rather perish than hate and fear, and twice rather perish than make oneself hated and feared--this must someday become the highest maxim for every single commonwealth.⁶

CHAPTER II

THE NATURAL HUMAN ORIGINS OF CONFLICT

In any serious study of the origins of conflict there comes a point where one is struck by the realization that war, the ultimate in conflict, is made possible only by man's willingness to fight. The implications of this are so fundamental and so bewildering that unless one considers well the proposition, one either dismisses the concept as meaningless or else one is drawn down pathways so esoteric as to yield little of practical value.

If there is one approach which must be brought to the study of conflict it is the pragmatic rather than the romantic, the realistic rather than the utopian. Yet one is drawn back to the profound realization that only man's willingness to fight makes war possible.

Why then does man fight? What forces drive men to war? The questions follow hard one on the other. Does man have a need for war? Does man provoke war to fulfill this need? Is man compelled to kill man?

Recognition that conflict is rooted in the nature of man centers on the instinctive or biological aggressive drives which motivate man in unconscious ways. The study of conflict from this elemental viewpoint has proceeded along two not dissimilar tracks. Biologists have studied animals to see if

knowledge of their instinctive behavior would provide insight into the behavior of man. Analytical psychologists have studied man to see to what degree rational behavior is influenced by subconscious motivations. Much light has been shed but the shadows still conceal more than the light reveals.

Biological Aggression

Biological aggression, the evolutionary interpretation of man's behavior, easily attracts adherents. It is widely accepted that there exists in the genes of all animals, including man, biological commands--instincts, if one prefers--which must be obeyed; survive and procreate are two of the most elemental and most easily accepted. The origins and nature of these biological commands evade comprehension. The study of animal behavior does provide insight.

Man is a primate and has much in common with other primates. Studies of apes and monkeys, also primates, has shown instinctive behavior patterns which can also be seen in man. These primates establish, maintain, and defend territory; so does man. They exhibit hostility towards territorial neighbors; so does man. They form social groups to increase the chance of survival; so does man. They establish systems of dominance; so does man.

In evaluating the results of animal studies one must avoid the anthropomorphic trap. C. R. Carpenter's study of

the rhesus monkey is a case in point.¹ This study established a significant relation between dominance and group aggression.

Carpenter tells of the appearance of a super-dominant rhesus; this giant of dominance scored ten times that of any other rhesus on a dominance grading scale used by the scientist. Under the leadership of this super-dominant monkey, the troop violated all known rules of rhesus behavior. It began systematically to attack the territorial feeding grounds of neighboring troops. In further violation of the normal rules of animal behavior, the territorial invaders always won. Intrigued, Carpenter removed the leader from the aggressive troop. They resumed their normal peaceful ways. The leader was reintroduced and the aggressive behavior resumed. One is hard pressed to avoid ascribing human values and attributes to animal behavior in this case for history abounds with analogous situations.

To some extent there is something to be learned about the behavior of man from the study of animals. This sort of study must be approached with caution. The differences in the behavior of man from that of animals is at least as great as are the similarities. Man's intelligence sets him apart. He has developed a complex language with which he can express abstract ideas. His society is, to a large extent, of his own design. Animals alter their society only to the extent environment demands. Man alters his society continuously.

Unconscious Aggression

The psychoanalyst sees the roots of conflict in man's unconscious. Since World War II analytical psychologists have increasingly explored the origins of aggression in man and have attempted to determine the relevance of man's aggressive drives to the origins of war.

Though nothing like unanimity has been reached it is widely accepted that man possesses basic aggressive drives which motivate him in unconscious ways. It is also widely accepted that there is a direct relationship between frustration and hostility. What is not clear is whether these aggressions and hostilities of individual man are converted into group aggression in the form of war.

One of the most influential theories which directly relates individual man's aggressive drives to war is that of E. F. M. Durbin and John Bowlby, British psychologists. Their position is that the aggression and frustration of the masses of individuals are the catalysis which send nations to war. They see within man "...a powerful and natural tendency to resort to force in order to secure the possession of desired objects or to overcome a sense of frustration or to resist the encroachment of strangers or to attack a scapegoat..."²

Further, that while the organization of man into political units inhibits private individual aggressive behavior, it made war respectable:

It is by an identification of the self with the state and by the expression through it that the individual has in recent times chiefly exhibited his aggressive behavior.

What then causes the state to embark on war? In the first place...the expression of aggression on a group scale appears to restore to it simplicity and directness. In the civilized adult the original and simple cause for fighting are forgotten and overlaid with every kind of excuse and transformation. But when aggression is made respectable by manifestation through the corporate will of the group, it resumes much of its amoral simplicity of purpose.

In the second place, states may fight... because of the pressures of transformed aggression within their members. The members of the state may be so educated, so frustrated, and so unhappy that the burden of internal aggression may become intolerable. They have reached a point at which war has become a psychological necessity.³

The Paradox

Is man still guided by the antique biological commands of territoriality, hostility, and dominance? Does man reason and then act or is reason blurred and rationality distorted by hostilities and aggressions which lie beneath the superficialities of civilization's patina? The evidence indicates that man is still bound to nature's way and that the origins of war are to be found in "...dark, unconscious sources in the human psyche."⁴

What then is to be done? Earlier it was stated that one must consider well to avoid dismissing the concept out of hand or being drawn down mystical paths which bypass the real world. In short, one must view the concept realistically.

Of course man possesses basic aggressive drives. The world's military establishments have long made use of these drives in training and in combat. So have the world's great proselytising religions, Christianity and Mohammedanism.

Of course man acts irrationally; the institutionalized charnel houses at Auschwitz and the individualized slaughter at Mylai attest to this.* Equally irrational, however, was Joan's refusal to deny her voices and the Spartan's determination to stand at Thermopylae.

No one doubts that unrelieved frustration gives rise to hostility. It was seen in the streets of Budapest in 1956 and Watts in 1965.

Of course war is made possible only by man's willingness to fight. It was such a willingness which led Attila to ravage half a continent. It also lead Charles Martel to Tours.

The realist recognizes the nature of man as aggressive, hostile, and irrational. In this aggressive, hostile, and irrational nature, the realist sees both damnation and hope. Having seen these things, the realist turns and moves towards those issues of more practical value for he recognizes the paradox.

If one assumes an immutable nature of man, a nature aggressive and inately violent, and if all else must be understood

*The behavior of man is a blending of the rational and the irrational. It is not an easy matter to define either term or to decide which is dominant in a given situation.

in terms of this nature, then one must turn to something other than the nature of man for a solution to the problems of man. By terms of the assumption, human nature cannot be changed.

Thus the paradox: the more clearly one sees the origins of conflict in the nature of man, the more surely one's attention is turned from the natural human origins of conflict.

Relevance

And what, one might ask, does all this have to do with a military theory of conflict? Everything, is the answer. Recognition that conflict is normal, that it is a part of man's nature, will, hopefully, bring the long view; it will serve to bring perspective to the study of conflict.

It must be recognized that man's aspirations and personal fulfillment are the roots of conflict. When one man's aspirations are at odds with another's, there must be a change on the part of one or a reconciliation of those aspirations. If not, competition begins for that which will satisfy those aspirations. Lacking control, the competition may broaden into conflict.

Conflict is normal. Conflict is continuous. The elimination of conflict from the human experience is impossible. The true goal should be to keep conflict within manageable limits.

Man's uniqueness lies in his unremitting struggle to free himself from nature's bounds and to dominate his environment.* It is paradoxical that man's struggle to free himself from the bounds of nature has bound him to still another struggle; a struggle for power. It is with power that man survives; it is with power that man predominates, and it will be with power that man ultimately achieves the freedom, the will, and the means to turn from war.

Till that day comes, man must continue his struggle for power. Now, in the thermo-nuclear age, man must join still another struggle; the struggle to control the power he has attained. It is precisely this element of control with which a theory of conflict must come to grips, for control is, in the true sense of that much abused word, vital.

*RAdm. H. E. Eccles commented: "The disastrous effects of the unquestioning acceptance of dominance being the natural role of man is coming more and more under critical review. Certain elements of the environment are definitely not dominated by man and there is no evidence to indicate that anything useful would be accomplished if they were. The path of wisdom lies in recognizing the areas in which man must think of adaptation rather than dominance." Conversation with RAdm. H. E. Eccles, Naval War College, 1 June 1973.

Admiral Eccles is, of course, correct. This does not alter the fact that one of man's distinguishing characteristics has always been, and probably will continue to be, his attempts to dominate the environment in which he finds himself.

CHAPTER III

THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

A military theory of conflict must primarily concern itself with international conflict for this is the stage on which military power and force plays out its vital role.

It has been stated that there is a continuum of international conflict which occasionally intensifies to the point of war. Humanity's problem is to so control conflict that this point is not reached. Such control will not be gained by idealistic and utopian dreams; it will be gained only by the realistic and pragmatic approach. Realism demands first an understanding of the origins of international conflict.

This chapter sets forth a theory that international conflict results from a struggle for power which is sought for three fundamental purposes: to insure national survival; to maintain the status quo; to expand existing power.

This theory must be judged by its purpose: to classify into an orderly arrangement what otherwise must be a mass of highly individualized series of circumstances. The theory must meet the empirical test: do the historical examples cited lend themselves to the interpretation the theory places on them?

International conflict is then considered a struggle for power in which all nations compete to one degree or another.

Whatever the ultimate goal of nations--peace, freedom, security--the immediate goal is power. It is with power that nations survive.* It is with power that nations control threatening situations and events. It is with power that nations build a society which frees man to pursue the higher and nobler purposes. So while nations rarely if ever go to war for a single reason, all the complex paths to war lead in the final analysis to the gate marked POWER.

There is a tendency to disparage power as if power itself were evil. Power is neither good nor evil; it is neutral. The uses to which a state applies its power may reflect

* Professor J. E. King raises the question, "Does the state really struggle for national survival? It is governments and rulers who make war. They do not always reflect the will of the nation (people)." Memorandum from Professor J. E. King, Naval War College, 21 May 1973.

When it is said that a state takes a certain action, it is acknowledged that this action does not always reflect the will of the citizens of the state. From a moral standpoint, the lack of citizen support for the actions of the state is significant. From a pragmatic standpoint, such a lack of citizen support is significant only when the people withdraw support or actively oppose the actions of government, thereby limiting the state's ability to act.

Bertrand De Jouvenel writes:

Such is Power's (the central governmental authority) dependency on the nation and so great its need to **make** its activities conform with the nation's necessities, that we are almost driven to the conclusion that the organs of command have been built up consciously, or unconsciously secreted, by society for use in its service. That is why jurists identify the state with the nation: the state, they say, is the nation personified, and organized as it needs to be for the government of itself and for dealing with others.¹

the character and values of the people; power itself is but the means; the nations must determine the ends for which power is used.

There is a fascination with the acquisition of power that is not understood. The inadequacy of the verbal symbols with which man writes, limits his ability to describe this fascination with power which sometimes seduces man into its misuse.

Power has a dual nature. One type of power must be used to attain additional power. Another type of power is required to control the power one is employing. Control of power is vital in the international struggle for power. Such control is ultimately grounded in the values and disciplines of the people of the state.

National Survival

A nation may be confronted with situations and events which invoke the survival imperative; act or face destruction. Military force is employed with little hesitation at such times. Though variations occur, four situations have historically moved nations to military action to insure national survival.

Invasion. No event is so direct and elemental as invasion by another state. The nation invaded either fights or surrenders. Nothing more needs saying.

Hostile Adjacent States. A nation faced with hostile adjacent states, unable to resolve the hostility and believing itself endangered by continuation of the existing conditions, may believe military action the only solution. Military action may be aimed at conquest of the hostile state, destruction of that state's military power, or at the capture of vital geographic areas. Whatever the immediate goal, the ultimate purpose is to insure national survival and predominance over the hostile state in future relations.

It does not seem unreasonable that this is the fundamental reason for North Korea's invasion of South Korea in 1950. Kim Il Sung could hardly have felt secure in his northern artificial state. The south was under the leadership of Syngman Rhee, a man genuinely revered by all Koreans for his efforts to free Korea from foreign domination. Professor Julius Pratt notes that the United States had provided South Korea with limited arms "...largely because of Syngman Rhee's unconcealed ambition to conquer the north."² If such ambition were known to the United States, they were surely known to Kim Il Sung. This fact coupled with the internal difficulties of building a new state may very well have led Sung to believe that the southern state threatened the existence of North Korea.

Without question, Israel's attacks against Egyptian positions in the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula in 1956 was

motivated by the survival imperative. Again in 1967, Israel's attack against the Arab states was to insure survival.

Weak Adjacent States. Dominance of weak adjacent states may be considered essential to national survival. The immediate aim may be to deny a lodgement to a hostile third nation, to insure the retention in power of a government sympathetic to the affected state, or to insure a more definite neutrality on the part of the weaker state. Action to effect these goals may range from invasion to economic aid. The risk of war to the affected state is directly in proportion to the action it takes.

Japan's actions in Manchuria in 1931 were based on this premise. Japan regarded Manchuria as part of her economic life-line and believed her vital interest threatened by the Kuomintang attempts to reassert Chinese authority over Manchuria. Japan through a series of military, subversive, and economic maneuvers established a puppet government in Manchuria.

The USSR apparently believed her actions in Hungary, 1965, and Czechoslovakia in 1968, necessary to insure the continuation in power of governments sympathetic to the Soviet Union.

The Chinese Communist entry into the Korean War in 1950 was most certainly motivated by fear of a United States lodgement in the adjacent territory of North Korea.

Israel's military actions against Jordan and Lebanon in the years following the 1967 war were aimed at forcing those

two nations into a strict neutrality which would deny operating bases to the Palestine Liberation Army.

Lack of Defensible Boundaries. A nation may consider its lack of natural defensible boundaries a vital defect and consider expansion to such boundaries necessary to national survival. It is obvious that defensible boundaries have diminished in importance as technology has increased tactical mobility and the destructive power of weapons. France would not today place the same importance on the Rhine as a natural boundary, as she did in the 1870's and the early 1900's.

That is not to say that the intrinsic value of defensible boundaries has diminished. Who that has such boundaries would give them up, and who that is without them would not acquire them? The point is that weaponry has acquired such a destructive capability that few nations would now risk war for a terrain feature. Yet, there are still circumstances where a nation considers the risk worthwhile.

During the Six Day War, Israel's principal objectives were the destruction of material stores and troop concentrations. Only slightly less important was the expansion of Israel's generally accessible borders by seizure of defensible terrain features: the Sinai Peninsular, the Gaza Strip, and the west bank of the Jordan. The importance Israel placed on these terrain objectives may be judged by her actions on 10 June 1967. A few hours after the UN cease-fire went into effect, Israel

reopened hostilities with a surprise attack on the Golan Heights; a small Syrian mountain range, overlooking Israeli territory and offering military advantage to the nation occupying it.

Nations believing their survival threatened will take almost unlimited risks to insure their continued existence.* The risks of war is a price most nations are willing to pay to insure continued survival.

The Status Quo

Maintenance of the status quo is subsidiary only to survival as a central purpose of state policy. Simply put, a policy of maintaining the status quo means that a state will conduct its affairs so that sovereignty is assured and as much independence and constituent power is retained as possible.

Few states adopt status quo as a comprehensive and deliberate national policy to be maintained over time. Status quo, instead, is usually accepted as a temporary condition when a State is confronted with circumstances which deny the opportunity

*Professor J. E. King raises the extremely important question, "Will states take unlimited risk to survive if convinced that unlimited action would be suicidal?" Memorandum from Prof. King, Naval War College, 21 May 1973.

Few states have faced this situation. Reason says that a state would avoid unlimited action if by so doing its destruction seemed assured. Reason, however, does not always predominate. The Melians chose unlimited action in the face of overwhelming odds. They lost and were destroyed as a state. Admittedly an Athenian siege does not offer the same expectation of destruction as does a nuclear attack. The question remains unanswered.

or involve a high risk in expanding existing power or in controlling situations and events. States may also adopt a status quo policy with regard to a given state of affairs or locality while pursuing other policies elsewhere.

To say that few states deliberately adopt a status quo policy is not the same as saying that all states wish to expand their power or control at the expense of other states. Some states, through circumstances of geography, population size, or social outlook have apparently put aside thoughts of expanding power or of controlling situations and events; Luxembourg, Sweden, and Switzerland are such states.

Maintenance of the status quo does not mean that a state is opposed to **any** change in the power distribution. Minor adjustments in the distribution of power which leaves intact the relative power positions is compatible with a policy of status quo.

Circumstances may even require a state to voluntarily divest itself of power. Such action is not a departure from a status quo policy if by so doing the state thereby insures sovereignty, independence of action, and retention of fundamental power. As a Commander may withdraw troops from an exposed salient to concentrate power, so a state may retreat from a position it can not long hold. Great Britain's retreat from empire in India, Palestine, and central Africa following World War II offers an example of prudent divestiture

of power to conserve fundamental power. On the other hand, her retention of Gibraltar show that this retreat from power was not a head long flight.

Thus in the struggle for power among nations, the traditional meaning of status quo, the existing condition, is expanded to provide for adjustments of power within the overall distribution of power in order to achieve a maximum of gain with a minimum of loss. Further, at times the maximum advantage may be gained only by incurring the loss of peripheral power.

How then, one might ask, does a state whose policy is one of maintaining the status quo become involved in conflict short of invasion by another state? Conflict may occur as a result of a change in national policy or from a misreading of national intentions. A brief look at these situations will provide insight into the origins of conflict.

Within the framework of the status quo a state may seek minor adjustments of the existing power distribution. If the adjustment sought is obtained with ease, the adjusting state may conclude that it is dealing with weak or irresolute nations and thus be convinced that a fundamental change in the power distribution may be had without great risk. Conversely, a state frustrated by failure to achieve limited adjustments within the framework of the status quo may conclude that to get what it wants it is necessary to change the basic power relationship.

Germany's remilitarization of the Rhineland in 1936 can be reconciled with the concept of adjustment within the framework of the status quo. None will now deny the failure of the League of Nations, and France in particular, to enforce the Versailles and Locarno Treaties convinced Hitler that he was dealing with impotent and irresolute states, thereby encouraging further aggression. On the other hand, the Netherlands repeated failure to secure adjustments of economic and religious grievances resulted in revolution against Philip II.

A fundamental cause of conflict is the misreading of national intentions. Thus a nation seeking minor adjustments may be viewed by others as threatening the entire existing distribution of power. It is now clear that just such a situation lead directly to World War I. Germany, fearful of a two front war against France and Russia, concluded defensive alliances with Austria and Italy. The Russo-German estrangement brought about by the lapse of the Reinsurance Treaty in 1891, prompted a Franko-Russian defensive alliance. Both Germany and Russia, and France as well, had made moves perfectly compatible with maintenance of the status quo. Yet the mutual fear and distrust of the primary partners in these defensive alliances gave rise to a series of diplomatic and military adventures which in retrospect lead inevitability to the battlefields of World War I.

Expansion of Power

Thucydides said it best. "Of the Gods we know and of men we believe, it is in their nature to rule where are they can."³

Nations which attempt to expand existing power are frequently said to be imperialistic. The term imperialism is, however, without real meaning today. It is pejorative and used mainly for polemical purposes. Its value as a term to describe a particular type of foreign policy, has been debased. A brief examination of the views of Professor Hans Morgenthau will be of benefit; he still seeks to legitimate the term imperialism.

Professor Morgenthau defines imperialism as "...a policy that aims at the overthrow of the status quo, at a reversal of the power relation between two or more nations."⁴ He then proceeds to place in perspective the current useage of the term:

The view that imperialism and any purposeful increase in power are identical is held mainly by two groups. Those who are opposed on principal to a particular nation and its policies, such as Anglophobes, Russophobes, and anti-Americans, regard the very existence of the objects of their phobia as a threat to the world. Whenever a country thus feared sets out to increase its power, those who fear it must view the increase in power as a stepping stone to world conquest; that is as a manifestation of an imperialistic policy. On the other hand, those who, as heirs of the political philosophy of the nineteenth century, consider any active foreign policy an evil

bound to disappear in the foreseeable future, will condemn a foreign policy that seeks an increase in power. They will identify that foreign policy with what is for them the paradigm of evil--imperialism.⁵

Thus the term imperialism has acquired a moralistic and idealistic illogicality. Its use is now avoided by fair-minded men. Here the phrase, expansion of power, is used without connotation of right or wrong; it merely describes the act.

Nations attempt to expand power for a variety of reasons, most of which are cloaked with ideological justification. If the origins of international conflict are to be understood, one must not concern oneself with justifications but with careful analysis.

The reality is that situations and events confront nations which, in the opinion of those who set policy, makes the expansion of power a necessary act. This expansion of power may be as dramatic and forceful as military force or as subtle as influence by cultural means. Whatever the means, if the intent of the state is to predominate in its relations with other states, that is an attempt to expand power.

Analysis of the situations and events which prompt nations to expand existing power will aid in understanding the origins of international conflict.

States are forced by internal pressures to expand existing power. There are at all times operating within the state

pressures resulting from population growth, economic need, and ideologies. These pressures may be as obvious as violent revolution or as subtle as a percentage point change in an opinion poll. These pressures are at once real and definite yet vague and elusive. They are easily recognized in a theoretical context yet defy detection in the real world: historians can, in their explanation of things past, point clearly to the effects of these pressures on the course of events; political leaders operating in the midst of events ponder the direction or even existence of such pressures.

Population and economic pressures operate as a function of each other. Population growth creates the need for economic expansion. If this economic need is met, economic expansion creates an opportunity for individual action, social mobility, and population movement. Radical social change results. If this economic need is not met, the end result is the same. A people beset by poverty and filled with aspirations when denied the opportunity to achieve economic sufficiency will in their frustration and anger rise up and demand action. Radical social change results.

Change operates inexorably as both cause and effect. Radical change or numerous changes in a society over a short period of time creates apprehension; apprehension gives way to fear; fear gives way to anger and action is demanded. Action produces change and the cycle begins anew.

These apprehensions, fears, and demands for action develop into ideologies which serve to attract more adherents and supporters and institutionalizes the dissatisfaction. The resulting pressures can force states into attempts to expand existing power to satisfy the demands of these pressures.

Such a situation existed in the United States after the Civil War. Social and economic dislocation was widespread. The dispossessed of war were joined by thousands of immigrants. The energy potential generated by the change of war and migration was enormous. But half a continent, largely unsettled, provided the opportunity for individual action with high expectations of success. So the dispossessed, the discontent, and the immigrants moved west by the tens of thousands and expended their energies in building a nation.

A unique situation in the Middle East brought these same factors into play: population growth, economic need and ideological pressures. The results were dramatically different. With the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, some 900,000 Arabs fled Palestine and settled in refugee camps in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. When it became evident that return to Palestine was unlikely, many Palestinian Arabs were assimilated into the local population; this was particularly true in Jordan. A large number, approximately one out of four, remained apart, refugees from Palestine; some stayed in the refugee camps, others in Palestinian enclaves within the local populace. These remain

for the most part poverty-ridden and an economic liability on the host country. Their fears and frustrations and hatreds have produced a bitter ideology whose goal is destruction of the state of Israel. There have arisen military, para-military, and terrorist groups known collectively as the Palestine Liberation Army (PLA). Though only a small number of Palestinians are involved in the PLA, it commands the support of most Palestinians and is supported by most of the Arab world. Most Arab leaders are consequently in a position where they must support or at least not publicly oppose the activities of the PLA, regardless of their excesses.

The activities of the PLA and the existence of the Palestinian refugees have been the catalyst that has kept the Middle East ablaze for twenty-five years. Though the situation is not typical, it does illustrate the results of the internal pressures of population growth, economic need, and ideology.

States attempt to expand power to exploit a lack of power. Wherever there is a lack of power, some state will attempt to expand its power to fill the void. Power expansion in such cases is usually economic and cultural in nature, though military power usually follows. The history of such power expansions into Africa, South and Central America, the Middle and Far East, and the islands of the Pacific is so well known as to make unnecessary either a summary of the conditions which invite power or the methods used to expand power.

It should be noted that during the 16th, 17th, and 18th century, such power expansions were frequently challenged by a third state. Military actions in support of these power expansions reached the point on occasion where the survival imperative was invoked and international conflict resulted. Portugal, Spain, Holland, England, and France were at varying times and in varying combinations involved in such power expansion attempts.

A new variation on this theme has developed in this century. Colonial states for the most part failed to develop broad-based power structures in their colonies. This lack of a viable broad-based government provided a ready target for nationalistic groups seeking to oust the colonial nations. World War II left these nations weakened or defeated, providing a unique opportunity for the nationalistic elements. Military force, guerrilla warfare, and terrorism--sometimes with outside assistance--were employed to exploit this lack of power.

Some colonial nations seeing the inevitable prospect of protracted conflict and unwilling to risk the loss of more fundamental power, retreated from empire. Others struggled for a time; some still continue to struggle. All recognize, however, that colonialism's time has passed.

The variations on this theme continue. Many of the new states, like their colonial masters, failed to establish viable broad-based power structures. In many of these states the focus

of leadership was on the revolutionary process of its "liberation." Little thought or preparation was given to the problems of how to govern after liberation. These new governments were reduced to desperate improvisations which things started going wrong. In many cases these governments seized on scapegoats, either tribal minorities or external oppressors, on whom to place the blame.

Since most Third World countries were artificial creations of their colonial masters, there exists various ethnic groups within these countries. Some of these groups are now moving to exploit this lack of power and domestic unrest by seizing control of existing governments or attempting to break away and form nations of their own. Since governments are rarely prepared to relinquish control of territory over which they have even nominal control, conflict almost always results.

These ethnic oriented groups in the Third World will continue to attempt to seize control wherever their numbers are large, their aspirations frustrated, and the government lacks broad-based power. These conditions threaten international stability. Other nations seeking to influence situations and events tend to be drawn into support of the incumbents or the insurgents. The result almost inevitably is to intensify the conflict, prolong the conflict, and chance a widening of the conflict.

States attempt to expand power so as to control situations and events. This concept is not fully appreciated as one of the basic causes of international conflict. No one doubts but that one of the central goals of any state is to control rather than be controlled by situations and events. The process of controlling situations and events has, however, been viewed in too limited a context.

It is thought to be negative: avoiding the expenditure of time, energy, and resources setting things right which shouldn't have been allowed to go wrong in the first place.

It is thought to be a reductive generalization of all the aims of state foreign policy: survival, maintenance of existing power, expansion of power, etc.

It is thought to be an intermediate process: having kept control of things, the state can then proceed when the time is right to achieve the aims of policy through political, economic, and military means.

It is also thought to be but a manifestation of the expansion of power.

The attempt to control situations and events is, however, more comprehensive than the usual concepts of such action. It is both a means and an end of state policy. Further, when viewed in the context of national interest, a purposeful expansion of power is a legitimate aim of state policy.

The control of situations and events is sometimes attempted by active modern states through surrogates. An active nation seeks surrogates in strategic locations. The sponsor nation invests the surrogate with power; military and economic aid is provided as a matter of course. Prestige, a definite form of power, is sometimes conferred through formal alliances. Control over the surrogate's power is maintained through close connections with the political and military establishments and by binding the surrogate to the sponsor economically and ideologically. The surrogate is then enjoined to support within its area of influence those goals and causes the sponsor state deems just and in accord with its national interest. The surrogate may be a sovereign state or a dissident group within a state.

The control of situations and events is an end to which all active states aspire. The power thus gained by the surrogate, is to some extent an expansion of the sponsor's power. Further, this expansion of power is obtained at a limited risk of war involving the sponsor.

Thus the active state is in a position to control situations and events within the surrogate's area of influence at a cost of only peripheral power. There are, however, risks involved in such undertakings.

The most obvious risk has already been mentioned. If two active nations with differing political outlooks select surrogates which are adjacent states, or two competing groups within

the same state, hostilities between the surrogates can bring the two sponsor states into direct confrontation. This has not yet happened; it remains a potential threat.

Another risk is that the sponsor state may become so closely identified with its surrogate that it may find its own prestige on the line. If this occurs, the sponsor state may be tempted to become directly involved with the problem facing the surrogate. It should be plain that a direct involvement by the sponsor state indicates that control of situations and events has already been lost. If control is regained by direct involvement of the sponsor, it is done only at the cost of real power. If control is not regained over situations and events after direct involvement by the sponsor state, then not only real power is lost but prestige also suffers. Peripheral power of other surrogates disillusioned by the turn of events may also fade.

The United States in 1965 was a sponsor state whose prestige had become closely identified with its surrogate, South Vietnam. United States aspirations to contain communism, frustrated elsewhere, now seem to center on the attempts by South Vietnam to defeat the communist supported Viet Cong, and South Vietnam was losing. The U.S. chose to become directly involved in its surrogate's war. Control of situation and events was never regained and the United States suffered the

loss of considerable real power and prestige; it also appears to have suffered the loss of peripheral power as well.

The Soviet Union in 1967 was a sponsor state whose prestige had become closely identified with its surrogate, The United Arab Republic (Egypt). The USSR's support of the UAR was tied to a far-reaching expansionist strategy in the Mediterranean and the continent of Africa. Israel's invasion of the UAR and other Arab countries in the Six Day War placed the Soviets squarely on the spot. The USSR chose not to become directly involved. Some loss of real power and prestige resulted. Subsequently, the UAR had the Soviet military advisors withdraw. This resulted in the loss of some peripheral power and prestige by the USSR. The USSR still retained considerable control over situations and events in the Middle East by continuing to support the Arab countries with military equipment or by withholding that support from one or more Arab countries.

There is an ongoing struggle for power and control of the sponsor-surrogate relationship; a wheels-within-wheels sort of thing. It has an effect on the situations and events each is trying to control.

The sponsor seeks advantage through his surrogate's involvement in situations and events. The more complete the sponsor's control over his surrogate, the more direct his influence on the situations and events in which he is interested,

and presumably the greater the advantage obtained. The sponsor, therefore, seeks the maximum control of the surrogate consistent with the reality of the situation. The sponsor recognizes that the surrogate must maintain an appearance of independence lest its ability to maneuver within the situations and events be diminished. The sponsor also recognizes, or at least it should recognize, that the surrogate will resist to direct and overt a control, and that if pushed too far, the surrogate will resist to the point where the relationship becomes a liability.

The surrogate, who entered into the relationship knowing that it involved the loss of some autonomy, seeks to minimize that loss while maximizing the advantages to be gained from the relationship. Thus the surrogate promotes its own interest, and attempts to maneuver the sponsor into the position of supporting the surrogate in those situations and events in which the surrogate is interested in controlling.

This conflict between the sponsor and the surrogate cannot be reconciled overtime. It too is a part of the continuum of international conflict.

The expansion of power through the use of surrogates so as to control situations and events will continue. It is a product of technology and ideology. Technology has increased the destructive power of weapons to the point that the superpowers must avoid direct confrontation. The twin ideologies

of communism and anti-communism have thrust their adherents into competition for control. The conflicting nature of these demands increases the chance for war. They will not be easily resolved.

States attempt to expand power for irrational purposes.

The reasons for expanding power which have been previously discussed were rational pursuits of national interest. While one may not always agree with such actions, one at least can understand them. A rational expansion of power always has limits. These limits may be imposed by political realism or by geography or by the degree of resistance encountered, but limits do exist.

There arises from time to time, a state or a man with apparently unlimited ambition. He pursues the expansion of power regardless of consequences. Drawing power from each success, he is driven on and on. Imperial Rome, Alexander, Napoleon, Hitler all had limitless ambition. Such men and states are thwarted only by superior force.

The possibility of irrationality in the conduct of international affairs should never be discounted.

Summary

It must be stated, lest its omission be thought the result of innocence, that the conditions under which conflict intensifies to the point of war are never so simple, direct, and clearly delineated as they have been presented here.

Nations rarely go to war for a single reason. Nor do nations usually go to war as the result of a pragmatic and realistic evaluation of the situations and events confronting them.

Nations go to war primarily as a result of miscalculation; sometimes war occurs through stupidity or arrogance; occasionally nations go to war from necessity. There are in operation at all times forces, pressures, good intentions, lack of foresight, inept implementation of sound policy, and a thousand and one things which lead a nation to war. For the most part these conditions are difficult to identify except in retrospect.

The complexities of human conflict are such that they defy reason. Human conflict, therefore, can never be eradicated. The rational approach can, however, help to control conflict. The pragmatic and realistic evaluation of situations and events can help to limit the intensity of conflict.

The realist recognizes that operating inexorably throughout the continuum of international conflict is a struggle for power. It is, in the final analysis, this struggle for power which leads to war.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONTINUUM OF CONFLICT

Perspective

There is a commonly held view of War and of peace. This view is that peace is the normal condition and War an aberrant phenomenon which occasionally interrupts the normal process of history. Those who hold this view see a distinct line between War and peace; they **view** War as the result of man's failure and of the failure of man's institutions.

This view of history is held not only by those good and solid citizens who think of war only when they and their sons are called upon to fight, it is also the view of some soldiers, many scholars, and not a few national leaders. The difficulty posed by such a view is that since the problem is seen in the wrong perspective, the wrong questions are asked and the wrong solutions are sought.

Consider the views of Richard J. Barnet, for they are not untypical of those who see war as a result of man's failures. Barnet has impressive credentials: he is a former State Department official; he served with the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and has been a consultant to the Department of Defense. Barnet writes:

...war is primarily the product of domestic, social and economic institutions. Of course, wars are triggered by external events. Of course, there are

such things as real conflicts and real threats. But it is the institutions in a society with the power to decide which are the most important threats and what should be done to meet them that determines whether a nation goes to war. For more than a generation American society has been organized for war rather than for peace.¹

Barnet seems to see America's wars resulting from America's failure to "organize for peace." But what of the other nations of the world: Barnet continues:

We are not saying that if American society were organized for peace, there would be no war. Obviously other nations also have it in their hands to plunge the world into war. But unless American society is organized for peace, the continuation of our generation of war is inevitable. The number one nation is in the strongest position of all to set the tone for international relations and to create the climate under which other nations deem it practical or impractical to organize themselves for peace. An America organized for peace would be far stronger--in terms of economic strength, domestic tranquility, and citizen loyalty--than the American empire.²

Leaving aside the unwitting arrogance of such a position, and the idea that any nation could so see the right and truth of things as to influence others by their moral superiority can only be described as arrogant. Barnet's position illustrates how a distorted perspective sends one seeking the wrong solutions.

The Barnets of this nation see an America standing aside from the turmoil of the world, concerned only with domestic conditions, and exuding a moral essence which will intoxicate all who smell it. The belief is that the other nations of the world will then, like Christian, flee the City of Destruction and join us in the trek towards the Celestial City of peace.

Such a romantic approach ignores the reality of things. The nations of the world now confront one another in a tightly knit international system. The action or lack of action on the part of a major power is felt and reacted to throughout the entire system.

The competition between the communist and anti-communist states provide but a part of the conflict which operates within this closed international system. Increasingly, the smaller and the "emerging" nations contribute to that conflict. The aspirations of many of these nations exceed their capacity for productive action. The mass-effect of their poverty and frustrated aspirations create additional conflict; their existence fuels the communist and anti-communist competition, for these competing states seek converts and surrogates for purposes of ideological leverage; ethnic and ideological blocs within the emerging nations compete for power and control; these nations compete with one another for prestige and resources to satisfy their aspirations.

There is no longer a distinct line between peace and war. There is a continuum of conflict. Within that continuum, there exists conflicts of varying intensity. That is to say, in the real world there is continual conflict ranging from relative peace to actual war. Absolute peace and unlimited war exist only in theory so as to frame the outside limits of the spectrum of conflict.

Rear Admiral H. E. Eccles, USN, Ret., considered by some to be the leading military theoretician of our time, places in proper perspective the conditions of peace and war:

Modern war is not merely the formal clash of overt armed forces with a beginning and an end, with a victor and a vanquished. Instead it is the whole spectrum or continuum of human conflict and has many overlapping and changing areas and aspects...

There is no longer a real distinction between peace and war. There is a continuing interplay of threat and counterthreat with varying applications of all the elements of national power and with varying uses of the tools and weapons of conflict including both overt and covert military force, subversion, sabotage, insurgency, mob violence, and terrorism.³

Conflict is a part, perhaps a necessary part, of the human condition. It has been pointed out that the origins of conflict are to be found in the competitive nature of man and his institutions. The realist recognizes that this competitive nature cannot be changed; he also recognizes that the same competitive nature which creates conflict has driven man towards the stars. The realist does not seek to abolish conflict; he knows that is impossible. The realist seeks to control conflict so as to limit its intensity. One of the first steps in controlling conflict is to understand the changing nature of conflict.

The Nature of Modern Conflict

Auguste Comte's remark that "it is the old that prevents us from recognizing the new" highlights the difficulty one

encounters when one attempts to think on the nature of tomorrow's conflict. Bernard Brodie pointed out the difficulty when he wrote:

It is our major dilemma in thinking about war and peace today that we do so within an intellectual and emotional framework largely moulded in the past. Our images, slogans, ideas, and attitudes on the subject of war, some of which are buttressed by the most powerful cultural sanctions, are transmitted to us from times when war was characteristically, with a few historical exceptions, a limited liability operation.⁴

Modern conflict is not a limited-liability operation. Its nature has been altered indelibly by the exponential increase in the destructive capability of modern weapons. It is generally recognized that any increase in the intensity of a conflict carries with it the possibility that mass-destruction weapons may be brought into use.

It is informative to reflect on the initial reactions to the existence of nuclear weapons. In the two decades following World War II, there was an unprecedented outpouring of essays and studies and books depicting the possibilities of nuclear war. Raymond Aron summarizes the two predominant schools of thought:

The optimists saw in the diabolical weapon the promise that this time "war was going to end war"; the nuclear explosive would accomplish what had been vainly expected of gunpowder; peace would reign at last, thanks to the progress of technology...

The pessimists heralded the approach of the apocalypse. The Faustian West, carried away by a satanic impulse, would be punished...having divined

the secrets of the atom, it possessed the sovereign capacity to destroy both itself and others...⁵

The predominant effect of nuclear weapons was to be neither world suicide nor enduring peace; it was to be restraint. This restraint did not come about over night. It evolved over-time. It had to do with the very nature of mass-destruction weapons which by their existence demand restraint from rational states operating within the international conflict continuum. This restraining effect is grounded in realism. One of the earlier and more effective calls for realistic restraint came from Professor James E. King, Jr., currently a faculty member at the Naval War College. In an article in Foreign Affairs, Professor King wrote:

The future counsels prudence but not faintheartedness. While using every opportunity to reduce international tensions and to extend the reign of order among nations, we must work positively for the limitation of war. To this end we must exert ourselves to the utmost in the technological competition to prevent the balance of the advantage from shifting to the other side...We must, in short guarantee that only effectively limited hostilities can be rationally undertaken.

Moreover, we must be prepared to fight limited actions ourselves. Otherwise we shall have made no advance beyond "massive retaliation," which tied our hand in conflict involving less than our survival. And we must be prepared to lose limited actions. No limitations could survive our disposition to elevate every conflict...to the level of total conflict with survival at stake.

Armed conflict can be limited only if aimed at limited objectives and fought with limited means. If we or our enemy relax the limits on either objectives or means, survival will be at stake, whether the issue is worth it, or not.⁶

To say that the effect of these mass-destruction weapons was to bring restraint to international conflict is not the same as saying that nations are no longer willing to risk hostilities or War. This has, of course, not been the case. How then has the nature of modern conflict changed? If force and threats of force continue in use, has the existence of mass-destruction weapons really brought restraint to bear on the international struggle for power?

Modern conflict has changed and changed significantly. The overall effects of the changes are complex and pervasive. Some elements of change have been intuitively accepted with little thought or discussion on the reasons for the change. Other elements of change have escaped general notice. It is possible to identify the general nature of the change through a series of terse assertions, only briefly expanded.

These statements of the general nature of modern **conflict** are simplified and incomplete. No attempt is made to substantiate each with empirical proof. Their validity and relationship are, however, believed to be sound and to provide the basis for further study.

Modern conflict is protracted. Protracted conflict is an eastern concept. Mao Tse-Tung has given it voice and direction. The concept of protracted conflict recognizes that peace and war are but verbal ambiguities and that time is a weapon. The concept does not require the immediate resolution of difficulties

nor that all problems be solved. This view of protracted conflict is rather like water flowing over land; denied way here, it flows there; dammed by situations and events it backs up till the mass-effect of its pressure reveals the weak points.

The aim of protracted conflict is the disintegration of will rather than conventional military defeat. The enemy's resistance is worn-down by the use of all the tools and weapons of ideological, economic, and military power. Overt military force is avoided if possible for a characteristic of protracted conflict is that the indirect is preferred to the direct and the covert is preferred to the overt. Restraint is inherent in protracted conflict for time is on the side of its practitioner.

Modern conflict has shifted to the periphery. The Middle East, black Africa, South and Central America, and Southeast Asia are the new fields of conflict. It is here on the periphery of power that the protracted struggle for power is being waged.

This shift to the periphery is a manifestation of the changing nature of conflict that is only superficially accepted by those societies which are oriented to a western-European outlook. These societies view the conflict on the periphery with a somewhat arrogant egocentric impatience. They are concerned with the conflict on the periphery but this concern is rooted in a desire to restore a semblance of order to this

conflict so that attention may be turned westward and inward where their true vital interests are perceived to lie.

This attitude ignores the reality of things. Modern conflict is at the periphery. It is on the periphery that major powers can maneuver for advantage without incurring the threat of mass-destruction weapons. It is on the periphery that many governments lack the stability of broad-based support, making them an easy target for ethnic and ideological "outs" seeking power and control. It is on the periphery that people, filled with aspirations and beset by poverty, are rising in frustration and demanding change. As long as these conditions exist, conflict will remain focused on the periphery.

Modern conflict involves the extensive use of surrogates.

The restraining influence of mass-destruction weapons, the search for ideological leverage, and the shift of conflict to the periphery all tend to make the use of surrogates a worthwhile, if not necessary, strategy. The super-powers must avoid direct confrontation on all but the vital issues. Yet the ideologies of communism and anti-communism demand of those who hold their tenets sacred, that converts and allies be sought. These conflicting demands of avoidance and action resulted in a search for surrogates. The surrogate arrangement permits the acquisition of indirect power by the control of situations and events. It also permits the disengagement or disavowal of the conflict, with minimum loss of prestige, if it intensifies to an unacceptable degree.

Modern conflict is affected by public opinion. This, one might object, is not new; it has always been so. There is a difference now. Communications technology has provided the citizens of "open societies" with a plethora of information on the policies of government; it provides them with immediate access to the events of conflict; it involves them in the passion of the moment. As a result, citizens of open societies are judging the worth of governmental policies and deciding which they will support.

There is also surfacing an attitude which attaches moral significance to the use of certain weapons and a disinclination to support the use of force in the pursuit of national objectives. The extent and eventual significance of these attitudes is not known. One can but note their existence and comment that public opinion would seem to restrict open societies from direct involvement in situations and events which offer the possibility that military force might be required.

Modern conflict is characterized by restraint between the major powers. This, of course, lies at the heart of this theory of the changing nature of modern conflict. Restraint resulted from the very existence of mass-destruction weapons. Restraint on the part of the major powers was reinforced by the recognition that such weapons were reasonably available to any nation willing to expend the resources for the necessary research, development, and production. The doomsday nature of

nuclear war brought about a mutual recognition that mass-destruction weapons would only be used in defense of the ultimate national interest. Consequently, these nations carefully define their goals to avoid threatening the vital national interest of other nuclear powers.

This then is the nature of modern conflict: it is protracted; its focus has shifted from the center of power to the periphery; it involves surrogates rather than major powers; it is affected to an unknown degree by public opinion; and it is characterized by restraint between the major powers in defining and pursuing national objectives.

The Irrational Element

Always lurking in the background of international conflict is the specter of irrationality. It must never be discounted. When irrationality gains sway, restraint ceases to function and war may then occur despite all the limiting forces which may be at work.

The specter of irrationality in the seventies is terrorism. This weapon of the desperate and the impotent bids fair to become an increasingly important form of international conflict. On today's international scene, the most notable acts of terrorism have erupted from the frustrations of that small segment of the Palestinian Arabs who have banded themselves together under the title of the Palestine Liberation Army. They have shocked the world with their complete disregard for life. They have

committed every act their resources permit. They have hijacked and destroyed international airliners. They have randomly murdered civilians not even remotely connected with their cause. They have invaded embassies; held hostages and murdered diplomatic personnel. They traverse international boundaries to carry out these acts of terrorism. They have even, like a crippled animal snapping at its own body, opposed by force of arms the very nations giving them shelter.

Similar acts of terrorism have occurred in Latin America. Though lacking at present the degree and scope of savagery that is shown by the various Palestinian groups, the potential is present throughout Latin America for wide-scale terrorism.

The limiting factors on terrorism at the present time are a lack of organizational control, the lack of an autonomous operating base, and scarce resources. If one or more of these deficiencies are remedied, the consequences could be far-reaching. Is there one who doubts that groups such as the Black September Movement would hesitate to use nuclear devices or bacteriological weapons if they were available?

The future of terrorism is unclear. It does not, however, appear to have run its course. It remains an obstacle to stability with which the international community must deal.

The Spectrum of Conflict

There is produced from time to time a work of scholarship that so clearly portrays the nature of its subject and is so

definitive that its acceptance is immediate and it is instantly identified with its author. Such a work is Rear Admiral Henry E. Eccles's Spectrum of Conflict.


Admiral Eccles first expressed this concept in a chart prepared for use at the Naval War College in 1954. The chart was later circulated in Washington and the term "spectrum of conflict" came into general use. This graphic portrayal of the varying intensities of conflict as they shift and blend and overlap has since appeared with revisions in Eccles's two major works.⁷ It has also been exhibited to and discussed by thousands of Naval War College students.

The result of this is that the Spectrum of Conflict is now so clearly Ecclesian that any attempt to interpret it falls flat and seems a poor imitation. Since it is impossible to deal with a theory of conflict without portraying the spectrum of conflict intensity, this paper will avoid a poor imitation and present the latest revision of Eccles's Spectrum of Conflict. (See Figure 1.)

Eccles comments on the Spectrum of Conflict:

The nature of war itself has changed. In particular there no longer is a clear dividing line between a state of peace and a state of war. The whole spectrum of human conflict is rooted in the fundamental characteristics of human nature. No graph can possibly show the reality of the confluence of varying forces, pressures, and uncertain reactions that make up human conflict. Nevertheless... (The Spectrum) ...gives a rough approximation of some of the forces and situations that overlap in continually shifting relationships and circumstances.⁸

FIGURE 1



SOURCE: Henry A. Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy
(New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965), p. 37.

Eccles's Spectrum then illustrates the varying intensities encountered in the continuum of conflict. Thus it provides insight into the complex nature of modern conflict.

This graphic illustration of the spectrum of conflict does have limitations which must be understood. The Spectrum lacks the dimension of depth and is therefore a simplified version of reality. It cannot capture the shifts and blends of intensity. It cannot illustrate the cause and effect relationship. It cannot illustrate the protraction of conflict.

It must be recognized that the Spectrum is not meant to precisely categorize and classify every possible condition and effect of conflict. It is a theoretical slice of the continuum of conflict. Its purpose is to educate; it is not a rule to be laid against life in an attempt to measure reality.

Every graphic and verbal attempt to portray the extraordinary complexities of human conflict will have serious deficiencies. This is not to say that by attempting such a portrayal one can't improve one's understanding. One must recognize, however, that the result will be but a rough approximation of reality. Eccles's Spectrum provides insight into the complex nature of modern conflict.

Summary

In a world of expanding technology, with an ever-increasing number of states being formed on ethnic and ideological foundations, where people are filled with aspirations and beset by poverty, the normal condition is competition and conflict.

There is neither peace nor war; there is a continuum of conflict. It is always present, always active; only the intensity of the conflict varies. The most intense form of conflict is, of course, war.

There are essentially two perspectives of this continuum of conflict, the romantic and the realistic. The romanticist sees the nature of man as tractable and susceptible to reform through educations and institutional change. He sees war as an aberration resulting from the failure of man's social institutions and, therefore, seeks to prevent war through reform of these institutions. The realist sees the nature of man as competitive. He sees this competitive nature producing both conflict and progress. He seeks to control the conflict so as to limit its intensity. A military theory of conflict must see things as they are and, therefore, it takes a realistic view.

The realistic view of conflict is that it is protracted; that the characteristics of both peace and war are present; that they shift and blend and overlap throughout the spectrum of conflict.

CHAPTER V

THE NECESSITY FOR FORCE

For eight tumultuous and divisive years America has been obsessed with Vietnam. Issues have arisen from that war which as they are faced or avoided will alter the character of the American people. The United States role in international politics will thereby be altered. Not all these issues have sufficiently formed themselves so they can be read. One issue which has sufficiently revealed itself so that one may assess importance and effect is the question of the necessity of military force in the resolution of conflict.

This, of course, is not a new question. It has been asked by man throughout history. The end of a war always raises the question anew, since man for a brief time is dismayed by the slaughter. In this regard the Vietnam War was exceptional only in that the need for military force was questioned early; the questioning persisted and communications technology provided unprecedented visual dissemination of the results of military force and the protests against that force. Current political, social, and military writings and discussions mirror the question: is the use of military force necessary to solve conflicts among nations?

Views On the Necessity For Force

Admiral Henry E. Eccles recently commented:

One of the most interesting trends in military and political discussions and literature today is the apparent implicit assumption that we will never again actually use military force on a significant scale.

The arguments, discussions, and actual policies that are adopted all seem to be based on the concept that everything we do is designed for deterrence of one sort or another. If the deterrent proves ineffective, and we have to engage in combat, we seem uncertain as to what we shall do.

I have a great feeling of unease as I listen to these discussions and read the literature. The factors which actually decide the outcome of hostilities seem to be downgraded time and again, more by implication than by overt statement.¹

Bernard Brodie in his latest and most important book, War & Politics, addresses the possible future of war and military force:

Where war was once accepted as inevitably a part of the human condition, regrettable in its tragic details but offering valued compensations in opportunities for valor and human greatness--or, more recently, an opportunity for the ascendancy of superior peoples--the modern attitude has moved towards rejection of the concept of war as a means of resolving international or other disputes. Especially striking is the marked fading of the pursuit of glory either as an incentive towards war and warlike acts or even as a suitable compensation for the evils of war induced by other causes. Present justification of war and of preparations for war appear to be confined largely to self defense--expanded by the superpowers to include defense of client states--or, in a very few instances, correction of what is conceived to be the most blatant injustice.

...that violence should continue indefinitely to take the specific institutional form known as war, which involves always a far greater intensity and magnitude of violence than is likely to be encountered through more spontaneous and less formal outlets, is now decidedly questionable.²

Thus "the dean of American civilian strategists" seems to suggest that the events of the recent past, the decades of conflict and years of war to which the world has been subjected, have provided man with the wisdom, or the caution, which will allow him to avoid the large-scale use of military force in the future.

Professor Samuel P. Huntington's recent article in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science deals with the role of the U. S. military establishment in the "post containment" era. Huntington cites the need for military parity with the Soviet Union; he calls for the development of doctrine to counter Soviet military intervention in Third World conflicts; he states the need for substantial naval forces in the coming decades. For all of that, there is a character, a mood, an ambience about the article which suggests that proper diplomatic maneuvering will obviate the need for military force.*

*There is intended no disparagement of the important concepts set forth by Huntington. The article is a far-ranging and provocative analysis of America's international role in the recent past and near future. Huntington's article is one of the first post-Vietnam strategic analyses that has not been dominated by a mea culpa view of that conflict. The article is of singular importance and deserves careful consideration.

This ambience is difficult to pin down since as Eccles says the issue is raised more by implication than by direct statement. A careful between-the-lines reading of a few select quotations will, however, reveal the implications:

In an era of negotiation, paradoxically, the potential uses of military force multiply: military build-ups, weapons decisions, deployments, and even actions, all become ways of not simply deterring military aggression by the other power, but also ways of putting pressure on him to make concessions at the negotiating table.³

The underlying question concerns the extent to which nuclear weapons can and will play a political role in the relations among states. The issue is not military capabilities, but the meanings which people attach to military capabilities and whose view of those meanings is to prevail.⁴

Existing European deployments of American forces have to be justified in terms of diplomacy, not deterrence.⁵

Brodie, Eccles, and Huntington are quoted not only to focus on an issue of contemporary importance but also to raise an issue central to a military theory of conflict. It would have been possible to do this by quoting full-blown romanticists whose idea of achieving peace is limited to unilateral disarmament and trust in the innate goodness of man. Such people are not, however, taken seriously. Brodie and Huntington are serious scholars. Their quotations cited above are not in themselves objectionable. Indeed, on a line-by-line basis one would agree with most they say. It is, however, what they do not say that points towards the larger issue. There is lacking the caveat that military force on a significant scale will

undoubtedly be required in the future. This omission lends weight to the implicit assumption of which Eccles spoke and brings into focus the larger issue of the need for military force in the resolution of international conflict.

The Evidence of History and Events

How does one assess such an intangible and emotional issue as the necessity for force? One considers the evidence of history; one considers the views of knowledgeable observers of the current scene; finally, through rigorous analysis of the evidence of history and current events and an intuitive evaluation of the results of this analysis, one arrives at one's own conclusions.

And what is the evidence of history? In 1968, the eminent historians Will and Ariel Durant capped the four decades of work on their monumental study The Story of Civilization with a slender volume entitled The Lessons of History. As to history and war, they wrote:

War is one of the constants of history, and has not diminished with civilization or democracy. In the last 3,421 years of recorded history only 268 have seen no war. We have acknowledged war as at present the ultimate form of competition and natural selection in the human species. "Polemos pater panton," said Heracleitus; war or competition, is the father of all things, the potent source of ideas, inventions, institutions, and states. Peace is an unstable equilibrium, which can be preserved only by acknowledged supremacy or equal power.⁶

Michael Howard, who refers to himself as an unrepentant historian, is without question one of the most astute observers of the current scene. He comments on the necessity for force and the acceptability of force. (One must pause to note that the necessity for force and the acceptability of force are not the same thing. The distinction between the two is quite often overlooked.)

To assume that great political ends such as the moulding of nations or the making of revolutions can be achieved without the use, or threatened use, of force, that necessary change can always be effected by rational bargaining and civilized discussion, is a western bourgeois illusion shared by nobody in any communists country and by a decreasing number of people in the third world. To assume that the use of such force will not involve tragic suffering to thousands who have done nothing to deserve it is, to put it mildly, highly optimistic. This does not absolve mankind from the obligation to labour heroically to settle its problems and effect its changes without **resorting** to force; though the knowledge that one or both parties can be relied on never to resort to force whatever the circumstance may make such negotiations not easier, but a great deal more difficult. Nor does it absolve mankind...from the obligation to see that if force is used, it should be done as economically, and with as little collateral damage as possible. But the events in Biafra, and in Vietnam, remind us that there are still questions today, as there were in Bismark's time, which cannot be settled by speeches and resolutions of majorities, but only by iron and blood.⁷

It is unnecessary to cite further authority. The reality is that war is a historical constant and to think that nations can compete in the international struggle for power without **resorting** to military force on a significant scale is naive. But as Eccles indicated much of today's political and military

discussion and literature implicitly assumes that large-scale military force can be avoided. Two questions of importance are raised by this assumption: first, how did this idea gain credence; second, what effects follow wide acceptance of this assumption; are they harmful, beneficial, or uncertain?

The Origins of the Assumption

How then did this assumption that force will no longer be required on a large scale gain credence? What factors gave birth to the idea? What conditions nurtured the idea? A full exploration of the origins of the idea is no small task since it seems rooted in the exhaustion that followed twenty-five years of cold war tension and in the frustration of some eight years of conflict in Vietnam. It is possible, however, through a series of terse assertions to turn the more important facets of the idea to the light of inquiry.

The possibility of nuclear war is now considered remote. There has been an intuitive rejection of the idea of nuclear war by most Americans. It has to do with a lessening of cold-war tensions and years of never-materializing threats losing their potency. There is also an element of self-deception involved. The immensity of the economic and industrial effort to construct an effective nation-wide civil defense system with the implied disruption of the normal social patterns of life resulted in an instinctive rejection of the civil defense concept by the American people and their elected representatives. Having

rejected--and probably wisely rejected--the sacrifice and discipline necessary to construct and exist under such a system, the American people then of necessity intuitively rejected that which would make such a civil defense system necessary--the possibility of nuclear war.

The end of the Vietnam War has signaled the end of an era. Supporters and opponents alike have turned with an overwhelming sense of relief from this tragic affair which neither group understood and neither group wanted. For different reasons, they now turn their collective national attentions to domestic matters. International difficulties and conflicts will not easily gain again the attention of the American people.

The concept of a continuum of conflict with its spectrum of varying intensities is not understood. In spite of the lessons of history and the evidence of events, war is still considered by most Americans an aberration. The idea that peace can exist even though violence and force appear in varying degrees is not accepted. The end of active hostilities is, therefore, considered peace. Peace once established obviates the need for force.*

*In fairness to Bernard Brodie, who was quoted earlier on the future of war, it must be stated that he holds no such simplistic views. He acknowledges that "...all eras have had to adjust to the idea that there could be international violence short of war."⁸

The disparagement of power requires a denial of the need for force. There are a goodly number of the American intellectual community which viscerally rejects the concept of a need for military force to resolve international conflict. This is rooted in the belief that national power is somehow evil and that America has a choice between power politics and some other form of foreign policy that does not involve itself in a struggle for power.

The acceptance of deterrence as a valid defense strategy has promoted the idea that conflict can be avoided. It is generally accepted that deterrence is a valid and comprehensive strategy. This mistaken belief has brought about the idea that the very existence of mass-destruction weapons has assured their **unuse**, and, thereby deterred the threat of nuclear **armageddon**. Nations, so the idea goes, spared the larger war can, therefore, avoid the smaller wars if they so choose.

These **attitudes** feed off one another, gaining momentum and visibility with each restatement. It is from these attitudes that the idea that large scale force is no longer necessary is gaining credence. Underlying all this is a general and pervasive weariness with war and international tensions and issues of great **moment**. The years of threats and violence and concern with international difficulties have taken their toll on the American people.

The Effects of the Assumption

American interest in international affairs is undergoing a change. Whereas the focus of attention in recent years has been primarily on conflicts and difficulties, the emphasis now appears to be moving towards those areas of mutual concern to many nations which offer the possibility of productive cooperation. The interest of private citizens and corporations as well as that of government is now being focused on such issues as the territorial limits of nations as they affect international fishing rights and international cooperation in the field of energy sources. Above all, the American people are showing an overriding concern with domestic matters. Thus the ready acceptance of schemes and solutions which offer an avoidance of involvement in international conflicts.

So the second question is reached. What effects follow wide acceptance of the assumption that force will no longer be required on a large scale; are these effects beneficial, harmful, or uncertain?

Some effects are beneficial. When a large and powerful nation like the United States directs even a small part of its international concern to matters such as the food potential of the sea, energy sources, and environmental control, some beneficial results assuredly must follow for these matters are of vital concern to all nations. Not the least of these beneficial effects is the very fact that the superpowers are exploring areas of cooperation in solving common problems.

Other effects of the assumption are harmful. The avoidance of reality always has a price. And the idea that the United States with its size, power, and importance could exist in this closely knit international system and avoid the conflicts that require the use, or capability to use, force is nothing if not an avoidance of reality.

These harmful effects cannot be spelled out in detail, for to do so would require an unacceptable degree of speculation. It is possible, however, to set forth in general terms the harmful effects to national security which could follow common public acceptance of the notion that the use of force on a significant scale is no longer necessary.*

The immediate and continuing result of such an assumption would be a reduction in military appropriations that would require significant reductions in the size and armament of the military establishment. There would naturally follow a corresponding reduction in military capability with a reduced expectation on the part of the Executive for the utility of the nation's military effort.

None of these things are in themselves necessarily harmful. Indeed, many would proclaim them cardinal virtues to be zealously

*The speculative nature of such conjecture is emphasized by the unavoidable use of such subjective terms in the statement of the proposition as "common public acceptance" and "significant scale."

sought. Most thoughtful people would agree, however, that the size and armament and character of a nation's armed forces should be in direct relation to the nation's point of view and economic condition. The dispute, of course, is over what the nation's point of view should be towards international affairs and how the economic assets of the nation should be utilized.

The danger to national security, in assuming that America can avoid the conflicts of the world, lies in the reduction of the military establishment without regard for the factors which make for operational readiness and combat effectiveness. That is to say: if the reductions are haphazard and made without regard to the need for conceptual harmony and unity of purpose in the employment of the military effort; if the budgetary system continues to try to force the service structures into alignment with the artificialities of the budget's terminology; if the budgetary process continues to promote interservice competition for defense allocations at the expense of doctrinal harmony; the result will be a reduction in military capability far below that planned or anticipated. The Executive is then left with an uncertainty as to the usefulness of the military effort to support even a maintenance of the status quo.

The long range results of a nation uncertain as to the use of military force and possessing a reduced military capability cannot be forecast without, again, indulging in speculation

difficult to control. It does need saving, however, that a weakened and uncertain nation is more likely to attempt sudden and unconventional actions during times of crisis than is one whose power is stable and whose purpose is certain.

Perspective

One cannot view the need for military force objectively unless one understands the concept of a continuum of conflict with its spectrum of varying intensities.

If one clings to the simplistic concept of peace being the normal pattern of relations among nations and war but an aberrant intrusion, then one will judge the need for military force on the basis of transitory moralities expressed for the most part by meaningless slogans.*

Whenever a nation conceives of peace as the absence of actual hostilities and takes this concept as its national goal, it is placing itself at the mercy of other states which are willing to use military force.

One must, of course, acknowledge the dilemma. A state in meeting its responsibilities to its citizens may very well have to take actions which when judged by the standards of individual morality may be considered immoral.

*It does provide perspective to recall that the "military-industrial complex" was once the "arsenal of democracy."

Such statements have been condemned during the bitter debates over the Vietnam War as evidence of the immorality of American society. Yet how much does the freedom to make such criticism depend on this country's ability to provide social and political security? Such security does not devolve upon a nation because of the goodness of its people or the nobility of its purpose. It is earned and it must be re-earned each time that security is threatened.

A Switzerland or a Liechtenstein may avoid any need for military force. But the United States cannot avoid being prepared to use military force in almost any part of the spectrum of conflict. Neither can the Soviet Union, The People's Republic of China, Japan, or Germany, or any other nation which occupies or aspires to a position of responsibility.

Raymond Aron writing in 1956 of the reverses suffered by the United States following World War II, vis-a-vis the Soviet Union, addressed the necessity for military force:

The American reverses recall the lesson...that strength without the will to use it, without a motivating idea is sterile.

Nothing would be more absurd than to seek in our century edifying illustrations of the theme of virtue triumphant. The non-violence of our Indian friends was effective against the British but it did not save the Jews of Europe from extermination and it would not have protected the Poles, Balts, or Central Asians from the Russians or the Germans. It was not non-violence, if we are to believe Mr. Khrushchev, which spared the Ukrainians the rigors of deportation, but their numbers.

Let us have the courage to admit that the fear of war is often the tyrant's opportunity...⁹

CHAPTER VI

THE USE OF POWER AND FORCE

Samuel P. Huntington writing of the Korean War and the American military establishment touched on the central issues in the use of power and force:

The United States had no sweeping goals; it simply wished to reestablish the status quo ante. This required the careful measurement and calculated employment of the military force to achieve this goal. Fighting a war according to Clausewitz rather than Ludenforff, however, was a new experience to Americans and one which they generally were unwilling to accept.¹

In the use of power and force two issues are always present, demanding the attention of political and military leader alike. These are the primacy of political purpose and the moulding of military strategy to the needs of national objectives. Without these twin controls imposed by the state, military force becomes an act of blind violence.

One has little difficulty in finding support for these concepts. Almost without exception, those concerned agree that the concepts are right and necessary. Yet if actions and words in other contexts are to be believed, the implications of these two concepts are just not understood.

Among the writer's contemporaries at the Naval War College, the complaint is frequently heard of the war in Vietnam, that it was a "political" war and that "political constraints" kept the military establishment from "winning the war."

A professor of political science from Amherst asked the writer, "Are there not conceivable situations where the JCS as a body would properly refuse to obey the orders of the President when it was clear that the Congress and the people were opposed to a war?"² Subsequent conversation indicated that this professor thought there were indeed such situations.

These two extremes illustrate the necessity for a critical look at these very important issues.

The Primacy of Political Purpose

That political purpose should dominate in the employment of military power and force is, on the face of it, a statement of the obvious. Civilian control of the military effort is, in the United States, a fundamental concept with almost total acceptance: scholars who write on politics and war seem to consider the concept so basic that while a statement of it is obligatory, exploration of the concept is rarely considered necessary;* those who hold political office accept without question the superior-subordinate relationship. The military establishment itself accepts its subordination as right and honorable; they refer to the relationship frequently in internal

*There are exceptions. Among the serious works which explore in detail the civil-military relationship, the most comprehensive are: Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1964); Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York: Free Press, 1960); Bernard Brodie, War And Politics (New York: Macmillan, 1973).

publications and cite it often as the reason why they should not comment on matters which are obviously political in nature.

For all of that, it is submitted that the central issue in the employment of military force is the primacy of political purpose. Though the concept receives obeisance from all quarters, there are implications and corollaries and subordinate concepts which devolve naturally from the original concept that are not generally understood. One need not look far to find examples of this lack of understanding.

The New York Times reported Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as testifying to the House Defense Appropriation Subcommittee on 9 January 1973:

(that he, Moorer)...always thought an invasion of North Vietnam would be a desirable move from the strictly military viewpoint...Asked if the JCS advocated a land invasion of the North as a means of outflanking the enemy, Admiral Moorer said, "Yes Sir, on occasion we have recommended the flanking movement you talk about."

Admiral Moorer stressed that the war was "not fought in accordance with basic military principles alone...(there were)...many political complications."³ (Emphasis supplied.)

The statement, as reported, suggests a lack of appreciation of the implications inherent in the concept of political primacy. To conceive of a major application of military force, such as invasion, "from the strictly military viewpoint" is to ignore the cause and effect relationship of military force and political consequence. To consider that warfare can be

conducted without "political complications" is to fail to understand that war is a political act.*

A restatement of the primacy of political purpose from the standpoint of military responsibility may improve perspective. The purpose of the military establishment is to create, maintain, and employ combat forces in support of political objectives.

It must be recognized that all political-military problems are interrelated; they interact in a changing cause and effect relationship. But whereas the military problems are in themselves capable of solution much as a puzzle may be solved, the political problems are really "difficulties" which respond to analysis and professional judgement and may be overcome but are incapable of solution.** Thus political purpose must dominate the employment of military force lest the political difficulties be worsened by improvident military actions.

*Any criticism which may accrue to Admiral Moorer from these remarks may be doubly applied to those Congressmen who received the testimony without comment. They, after all, occupy the superior position in this superior-subordinate relationship. One can be certain no such criticism was made; the media would have gleefully reported every word.

**For an enlightening discussion of the "puzzle" and the "difficulty" see Henry E. Eccles, Military Concepts and Philosophy (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1965), p. 121-131.

There has arisen over time an inexplicable attitude towards the employment of military force and the primacy of political purpose. This attitude, which is held not only by some military men but by a few political leaders as well, seems to be that while the decision to use military force is a political one, that "once the guns begin to shoot" political leaders should defer to military men for the problem then becomes one of the attainment of victory. This attitude is expressed by, of all people, Mary McCarthy in a review of Halberstam's The Best and the Brightest. She wrote:

On the whole, the generals perceived the logic of the Vietnam commitment quite clearly: if you were going to stay there, you would need more men, more hardware, you would have to bomb the north, and the sooner the better, mine Haiphong harbor and not hesitate to hit the dikes. Given the aim, they were right; maybe, given the aim, General Curtis LeMay was right: if victory was what was wanted... (Emphasis supplied.)*4

The whole point of the matter is that Miss McCarthy is wrong and so are any military men who think that once the war begins, victory in the MacArthurian sense becomes the dominant factor. Perhaps this was true in an earlier and less complicated age, though one would be hard-pressed to identify the era. After all, the single unifying thread in

*Lest one get hung-up on whether the tactics referred to should or should not have been employed, it needs saying that the point has nothing to do with all that. The point is surely that war is a political act and that one cannot consider military actions of consequence without considering the political implications.

Clausewitz's On War is that war is not an isolated act of violence but a continuation of politics and therefore must be subordinated to political purpose.

This MacArthurian concept of victory--"There is no substitute for victory"--has little meaning in matters of national strategy today. It is a dangerous and outmoded concept for a nation to espouse in this time of thermo-nuclear weapons and protracted conflict. Military success is now gaged, as indeed it has probably always been, on attainment of political objectives.

That is not to say that tactical victory, victory on the battlefield, has lost its importance. It has not. Whenever an army takes the field, whenever a fleet deploys for battle it does so with the expectation of victory and must bend every effort to achieve that victory.

The objectives of foreign policy today are to control situations and events so that long-range national interests are served without intensifying conflict to the point where national survival becomes at issue. This is the restraint which nuclear weapons have brought to the international struggle for power. To insure that this restraint is operative throughout the Spectrum of Conflict intensities, the Executive will exercise rigorous control of policy and its implementation.

This rigorous control of policy implementation will be felt most keenly during actual hostilities. The need to limit the scope and intensity of conflict will result in the Executive reserving to itself not only control of mass-destruction weapons but also the authority to use weapons and techniques which heretofore have been considered conventional.

Thus, electronic and thermo-nuclear technology has brought about a situation where the Executive is willing to accept stalemate and tactical defeat on an unprecedented scale if the alternative appears to be an increased chance of the use of mass-destruction weapons. A new dimension is thereby brought to warfare; a dimension with which civil and military authority has not yet come to grips.

Civil authority must distinguish with great skill between those matters which are of central importance and those which are peripheral to the national interest. Civilian leaders must understand how to use military force appropriately and effectively. They must also learn that the time to assess the morality of a particular use of force is before that force is brought to bear. Admiral H. E. Eccles speaks to these needs:

In essence this boils down to a twofold necessity: a keen sense of mutual responsibility and the development of conceptual unity and coherence starting at the top and descending through the command.

The politician has the responsibility to establish and express his policy in such terms that it can be militarily supported. The military man has the responsibility to carry out the military aspects

of the policy. However, it is absurd to believe that the politician can expect loyal support when he is ambiguous and vacillating in his policy. He therefore has the obligation to develop conceptual unity and coherence. When circumstances require a shift in policy, he has the responsibility to maintain clarity and coherence in the new policy.

To the degree that the politician insists on the subordination of the military to the civilian, to that same degree he increases his obligation. If he acts otherwise there will be two inevitable consequences: the political-military effort will be hampered and perhaps defeated, and good and loyal men will become frustrated, perhaps beyond normal endurance.⁵

Military authority is faced with an even more direct and elemental burden as a result of this new dimension of warfare. The military establishment must be able to accept the no-win situations and the tactical defeats and still maintain a viable combat force with high morale. In the continuum of conflict there are no time-outs for Hamlet-like introspection and social experimentation with basic concepts such as discipline and individual responsibility.

It is clear that the military power of the United States has been decreased by the Vietnam war and its associated disruption of domestic affairs. This stems directly from the distortion of basic values and the downgrading of those essential military concepts which make for operational readiness and combat effectiveness. How this distortion of values and downgrading of essential concepts came about is of less immediate importance than is their identification. Identification of these values and concepts will permit the restatement of their

worth. With perspective regained the military establishment will be better able to review its role in the light of the changing nature of conflict. Admiral Eccles has identified and expressed these essential values and concepts in a unique and telling manner. The following quotations will provide insight into the challenge faced by the military establishment.

Integrity of Command. The essence of command lies in an elusive combination of intangibles that are very difficult to define or confine to the limits of any particular social system or culture. Usually it seems to include such elements as professional competence, self-confidence, and mutual confidence, leadership, and honor. Above all there must be both loyalty up and loyalty down.⁶

Social-Political Discipline. Because of a mass popular misconception, the word "discipline" has become a synonym for fascism and so its use in any political sociological context is, to all intents and purposes, forbidden.

Perhaps we need a new phrase to describe discipline as I use it. "Discipline in its deepest sense means: a sense of values; the knowledge of cause and effect; the willingness to make decisions; the willingness to accept personal responsibility for the results of such decisions."

In this sense discipline is a fundamental safeguard of political freedom and of reasonable social stability. It is the foundation of national security in its military, economic, and political aspects. The word "discipline" ultimately includes the understanding of the whole interacting complex of abstract terms: justice, law, order, power, and force. It is essential to control humanity's instinctive use of violence for foolish or selfish purposes...

The question of social-political discipline comes to an awesome focus in the problems of national defense in the nuclear age.⁷

Soda Fountain Morale and Weapons Morale. Two concepts of morale are almost continually in opposition in this country, with the result that we have usually sought a compromise and have based our morale program on portions of each. At the risk of oversimplification,

these concepts may be called "soda fountain morale" and "weapon morale."

The concept of soda fountain morale is that high military morale is created or at least greatly stimulated by luxuries, privileges, and fringe benefits.

The concept of weapon morale is that high military morale is developed primarily by rigorous discipline, hard training, confidence in one's leaders, one's weapons, and one's ability to use them, and above all by pride in one's ability to accept great risk and hardship.⁸

There is a proposition which normally applies to drastic change within large organizations, it has almost the status of law, and that is, significant and pervasive change must come from outside the organization. But it is doubtful that will occur in this situation. The nature of national elective office is such that the Executive and Legislative have little incentive to institute such changes. Those appointed to Executive office do not generally have the background to evaluate the need. So, if it is to come, it will come from within.

It is by no means certain that these things can be accomplished: the reestablishment of the integrity of command; acceptance of the type and degree of discipline needed; indoctrination of weapons morale. If these things are accomplished it will be because the military establishment has looked deep into its soul and recognized some fundamental truths:

The intellectual and moral problems of the employment of military force are more complex than are the technical ones.

The intellectual, moral, and professional demands on military leaders today are greater than ever before. The need for

superior men with intellectual integrity and moral courage is therefore greater.

There is a fundamental loyalty to country which transcends loyalty to individual service and immediate superior.

The sociological and egalitarian approach to military policy and organization will result in mediocrity.

The ethical standards, the demands of duty, and the performance of military men must be above those required in civilian life.

Sir Richard Livingston, an educator, once wrote:

It is the weakness of rich and complicated societies like our own that they tend to live in externals, to concentrate on the techniques of their life. But education, while it must provide for these, can only base itself on them at the expense of neglecting more important things. Such an education will produce mere technicians: by a mere technician I mean a man who understands everything about his job except its ultimate purpose and its place in the order of the universe. They are a very common type.⁹

The harsh reality of this age of protracted conflict and thermo-nuclear weapons is that the use of military force is sometimes necessary. If the military establishment is to effectively employ force within the spectrum of conflict, it must be led by men who are more than mere technicians; it must be led by men who understand the ultimate purpose of military force.

National Objectives and Military Strategy

Alfred North Whitehead used the term "verbal symbols" to indicate the imprecision of language. Few areas of human endeavor have the need for precision in language and thought required by those disparate functions described as "national security". Paradoxically, nowhere is semantic distortion more prevalent. The term "Pentagonese" has become a cliché for semantically obfuscating what would otherwise be perfectly clear.

In an attempt to reduce the semantic confusion, the following brief definitions relating to foreign policy are presented.* It is recognized that these definitions will not satisfy every reader, nor will they cover every aspect of their subject. They will, however, reduce the inevitable semantic distortion by providing a standard.

National interest is the general and continuing end for which a state acts.

Interests are those diverse motivations for security and well-being which may vary or conflict as circumstances change.

Principles are the enduring modes of behavior or the relatively established guides to action that characterize nations.

National objectives are specific goals designed to support an interest or principle or some combination of the two.

*These definitions are derived from William Reitzel, et al., United States Foreign Policy, 1945-1955 (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1956), p. 471-474.

Policies are specific courses of action designed to achieve objectives.

When nations existed in relative isolation, strategy was merely the direction of a nation's armed force. That restricted concept is no longer adequate. The bounds of strategy have been stretched by technology and events. To be understood today, strategy must be viewed in relation to national objectives and the policies of those objectives; strategy must also be viewed in relation to its military instruments, tactics and logistics.

Then, one might ask, what is strategy? The three leading military theorists, in this writer's opinion, have provided definitions which bring insight.

Clausewitz: "Strategy is the use of the engagement to attain the object of war. It must therefore give an aim to the whole military action, which aim must be in accordance with the object of the war."¹⁰

H. H. Liddell Hart: "We can now arrive at a...definition of strategy as--the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy."¹¹

Henry E. Eccles: "Strategy is the comprehensive direction of power to control situations and areas in order to attain objectives."¹²

The element common to these definitions is the identification of the military effort with the political purposes of the state's policies and objectives.

Eccles's description of strategy is more than a definition; it is a terse summary of a unitary concept of comprehensive control.* This idea of comprehensive control has implications of importance. Strategy, when viewed as comprehensive control, is raised to a position of primacy in the conduct of the nation's foreign policies. That is to say, comprehensive control requires an examination of the reason for that control--objectives and their policies. Thus if strategy is to, in effect, sit in judgement of objectives and policies, then strategy is elevated beyond military control. This is the central point of the matter and bears further examination.

Military strategy is but a part, albeit a vital part, of the national strategy. The nation's strategy involves the formulation of national objectives and the development of policies to achieve those objectives. Comprehensive direction requires that the nation's military effort be focused directly on the support of these national objectives and that the policies designed to achieve the objectives be evaluated in light of the military's ability to support with force if necessary.

Thus the military establishment must analyze and evaluate those policies which support objectives as must all other involved agencies of government. The need for military analysis and evaluation has two bases:

*It should be emphasized that the concept of comprehensive control is that of Admiral Eccles. The expansion of this concept as presented here is the writer's: Eccles is blameless.

The size, organization, and functions of the military establishment must be in consonance with the national objectives they support.

The implementation of policy must be rigorously controlled lest in times of crisis the turmoil of events obscure the objectives of policy and failure result.

Success in both these efforts is dependent upon complete understanding of national objectives and of the implementing policies. Such understanding is difficult to obtain. A brief look at the process by which national objectives and policies are formulated will show why this is so.

Some national objectives and policies are established on the basis of the preceived interests of the administration in power: threats to the territorial United States; overriding domestic needs; the domestic and foreign policy realities as seen to affect the administration.

Other national objectives and policies are relics of previous administrations which remain in effect because of the dominance of established policy. Each day a policy remains in effect it becomes more firmly entrenched and soon acquires a life and momentum all its own. Each decision made and each action taken reinforces and reaffirms the validity of that policy, for those making the decisions and implementing the actions acquire a vested interest in continuing the policy and therefore support the objective. The dominance of established policy

effectively rules out internal reviews and requires that great effort be expended if established policies are to be undone.*

These national objectives and policies are rarely expressed in direct and tangible terms. They are most often expressed in general and idealistic terms. Earlier it was said that in this age of protracted conflict and thermo-nuclear weapons that military success was based on the attainment of political objectives. How then are military planners to distinguish between those vital objectives on which military success is gaged and idealistic slogans?

Military planners must have a conceptual understanding of the national objective and a firm grasp of the overall effect desired from supporting policies. Supportive military plans are useless if their objectives are mere restatements of the hopes and ideals of national principles. They must instead identify those objectives which are essential to the policies the plans are designed to support.

This requires identification of not only the military objective but the political, economic, and social objectives

*The dominance of established policy was aptly illustrated by the most dramatic change in foreign policy in recent years; the decision to abandon the policy of containment and seek a reapproachment with the People's Republic of China. The President limited advanced knowledge of the initial overtures to an extremely small group of advisors. This was in no small part due to the resistance that the President knew would develop from inside and outside government if word leaked prematurely.

of policy as well. It requires an ordering of the major and subsidiary objectives by priorities. It involves a detailed and continuous examination of interests, national objectives, and policy. It requires discrimination between those objectives which are central and those which are peripheral; it requires an identification of the long and short-range objectives of policy.

These requirements are impossible, of course; they simply cannot be met. The press of time on military planners at the national level is such that it does not permit analysis in this detail. Still, analysis of the objective is the key.*

The military planner recognizes that the objective is central to any strategy and analysis of the objective enables him to plan supportive strategies with their related tactical employments and logistical preparations. A highly simplified analysis of an objective would require consideration of the following:

Overall effect: What is the overall effect desired from the policy? Would this effect, if achieved, support the goals of the objective?

Assumptions: What are the assumptions on which this policy is based? Are these assumptions valid? What events would invalidate these assumptions? Would the use of military force effect the assumptions; how? What affect would counter-force

* Analysis of the objective is discussed perceptively and at some length by Admiral Eccles in Military Concepts and Philosophy, p. 41, 51-56, 285-293.

have on these assumptions?

Objectives: What are the specific objectives of the policy? What are the minimum key objectives of the policy? What is the relative importance of these objectives? Would the use of military force change the priorities of the objectives; would all objectives then remain operative? Would the use of counter-force alter the priorities of any of the objectives?

Force and Counter-Force: What events would most likely require a response with military force? What minimum military action would be required to attain all the objectives of policy; the minimum key objectives? What counter-forces will be set in motion by the use of military force?

Compensating Measures: Will compensating measures be required to offset the counter-forces set in motion? Will the compensating measures be military in nature? What effect will the compensating measures have on the overall effect, assumptions, or objectives?

Finally, and of fundamental importance, is, a statement of what constitutes satisfactory attainment of the objective.

It hardly needs saying that analysis of the objective will not prevent the establishment of unwise policy or of unobtainable objectives. Neither will it prevent inept implementation from destroying the effects of sound policy. It is obvious that asking all of the questions listed above will not of itself provide the strategic planners with the comprehensive controls

needed. All of the questions can never be answered and some answers will be highly speculative at best. Nevertheless, analysis of the objective is necessary if subsequent military action is to have practical value.

With the conceptual unity gained from analytical process such as analysis of the objective, military leaders will be able to control the implementation of policy so that national objectives and their policies will remain visible amidst the turmoil of events.

It is also from such analysis of interests, national objectives, and policies that there will emerge the new strategic concepts and military policies and doctrines that will pave the way for adaptation of the military organizations and functions as American foreign policy moves from its containment posture of the past twenty-five years.

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
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSIONS

Lytton Strachey in his preface to Eminent Victorians commented that it was impossible to write a history of the Victorian age; too much was known of it; that ignorance was the first requisite of the historian. But, he continued, it was possible to illuminate it by a different technique:

If he is wise, he will adopt a subtler strategy. He will attack his subject in unexpected places... He will row out over that great ocean of material and lower down into it, here and there, a little bucket, which will bring up to the light of day some characteristic specimen, from those far depths to be examined with a careful curiosity.¹

This, in a sense, is what has been attempted in this brief paper. From a vast ocean of issues related to conflict and War, a few carefully chosen and, hopefully, characteristic specimens have been drawn. They have been examined with a careful curiosity; if that curiosity has been accompanied by some degree of insight, then purpose will have been served.

It needs saving that though there is indeed a vast ocean of material on conflict and War and related matters, much of it lacks value: trivial and peripheral matters are explored in depth; irrelevant issues are searched out and examined while fundamental issues, unnoticed, are trod underfoot. The reasons for this are complex and varied; it is, however, both possible

and necessary to generalize on what are seen as the fundamental deficiencies in political-military discussions, and writings and consequently in policies and plans.

There is no comprehensive and coherent military theory or philosophy adequate for this age of protracted conflict dominated by weapons of mass-destruction. The piecemeal approach to political-military problems omits fundamental or critical issues; it fails to recognize the military implications of social, economic, and political issues; it fails to recognize the social, economic, and political implications of military issues and actions; it fails to identify the cause and effect relationship that operates throughout political-military affairs.

Many professional military men and government executives are disdainful of theory and history. These men, the professional soldiers, those appointed to executive office, and those elected to public office, are action oriented. They are concerned with doing; they are occupied with personnel--as opposed to people--, hardware, methods, and performing. They seek the single-paged, double-spaced summary; they avoid the details which illuminate. They have neither the time for the inclination for the study and contemplation needed to derive benefit from the discipline of theory and the lessons of history.

Many scholars and scientists view the political-military difficulties with a perspective distorted by their field of

competency and their position. In one sense, such a distortion occurs because, not unexpectedly, these scholars and scientists tend to view much of the difficulty as arising from the failure to accord their views and particular disciplines primacy in the conduct of these affairs. In another sense, the lack of personal responsibility--always a sobering influence--for the development, implementation, and outcome of a policy leads to pronouncements and advocacy of specific plans and doctrines outside the scholar's field of competency.

These are but the most obvious deficiencies one encounters when attempting to examine the concepts and issues of conflict. Conversely, these very deficiencies point the way by which men of varied capabilities and backgrounds may approach the study of conflict.

The need for a comprehensive military theory, which will embrace the many elements of military affairs, has been shown. It, however, quickly becomes apparent to one who attempts to deal with even a minor element of conflict that such a theory can never be completed. There are just too many elements. They overlap and are interdependent. For every basic concept there are corollaries and subordinate concepts and implications which demand recognition. One must deal with those elements which tend to change rapidly as well as those which change gradually. Further, one must consider the interplay and feedback between military concepts and non-military thoughts and actions.

When confronted with the complexity and magnitude of military theory, one is apt to dismiss the need as unobtainable or really not necessary. Academicians manage this much more smoothly than do professional military men. The military professional tends to ignore military theory; it's difficult to find reference to military theory in books written by military men and when one finds such a reference it is frequently found that military theory is considered synonymous with strategy.

The academicians, more skilled in the techniques of avoidance, point out that the important concepts are adequately covered by existing theories of political science and international affairs; that what remains is but manipulative techniques of employing men and machines, a somewhat mechanistic skill, which is adequately taught in military schools. So many tend to depreciate the need for military theory. Bernard Brodie, in what he considers his most important book, according to the dustcover writeup, War and Politics, mentions "theory" but twice and both times depreciatingly; once he refers to a "theory" of international relations--the attention-gaining quotation marks about the word are Brodie's.² Next, he refers to "theory" as a synonym for strategy.³ Not all civilian scholars depreciate military theory. Huntington says:

Understanding requires theory; theory requires abstraction; and abstraction requires the simplification and ordering of reality. No theory can explain all the facts, and at times, the reader of this book may feel that its concepts and distinctions are drawn too sharply and precisely and are

too far removed from reality. Obviously the real world is one of blends, irrationalities, and incongruities: actual personalities, institutions, and beliefs do not fit into neat logical categories. Yet neat logical categories are necessary if man is to think profitably about the real world in which he lives and to derive from it lessons for broader application and use...The study of civil-military relations has suffered from too little theorizing.⁴

Those concepts of a theory of conflict which have been examined in this paper may seem self-evident and elemental. If so, then in part the effort has been successful, for one must pass through complexities before one can express simply, ideas of importance.

It is this expression of ideas and concepts that is the worth of this initial step towards a theory of conflict. It was intended that this paper would provide a foundation upon which others could build. It is hoped that this foundation is broad enough to span the separation between military theory and political theory.

There is a need for the political theorist to expand into the area of civil-military relations. As was pointed out in Chapter VI, there is a lack of understanding of the implications of the primacy of political purpose in the conduct of military affairs. Admiral Eccles has pointed out the areas of civil-military relations where conflicts occur as:

Political control of the creation and deployment of weapons and forces.

Political control of the use of military force:

- Initiation of the use of force.
- Limits on resources made available.
- Limits on scope of action.
- Limits on weapons employed.
- Determination of tactics employed.
- When and how to bring an end to hostilities.

Political control of producer logistics:

- Control of requirements
- Partisan influence on infrastructure.
- Sociological requirements in procurements.
- Budget control.⁵

The military theorists must also address these matters of civil-military relations, as has been done in this paper. Thus, as the difficulties are addressed by both the military and political theorists, the gap if not bridged will at least be made less treacherous.

The concepts presented here also provide a foundation for the military theorist to build upon so that he may expand into the areas where the military problem begins: strategy, tactics, logistics, and command. It is these components of the military problem with which the military decision-maker must deal. Whether it be the strategic planners at the national level or a commander in combat, these components of the military problem must be intuitively evaluated before the decision is made.

It was earlier stated that a comprehensive military theory can never be completed. This is also true of the major concepts which are the constituent parts of such a theory. Thus, the theory of conflict will never be complete or perfect; it will continue to evolve. But as it grows and its chief elements

and structure and principles are identified, it will serve to bring coherence and perspective to the conduct of military affairs.

The inadequacies of this effort to identify the major ideas and concepts with which a military theory of conflict must come to grips is assuaged to some extent by the obvious truth expressed by Alfred North Whitehead when he said, "One must omit much to get on with something."⁶

APPENDIX I

A TOPICAL OUTLINE OF A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF CONFLICT

APPENDIX I

A TOPICAL OUTLINE OF A COMPREHENSIVE THEORY OF CONFLICT

THE NATURAL HUMAN ORIGINS OF CONFLICT

At some stage a necessary condition for conflict is man's willingness to fight. A comprehensive theory of conflict must examine the biological and psychoanalytic factors which drive man to compete and strive for dominance.

Individual Man

- Needs, aspirations, expectations
- Biological Factors
- Psychoanalytic Factors

Collective Man

- Group needs, aspirations, expectations
- Friction of competition
- Need for individual and group identity
- Territorial needs

The Effects of Change

- Effects of change on individuals
- Effects of change on groups
- Leadtime of change
 - Effects of rapid drastic change
 - Effects of limited cumulative change overtime

THE ORIGINS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT

International conflict results from a struggle for power which is sought for three fundamental purposes: to insure national survival; to maintain existing power; to expand existing power.

Threats to National Survival

Invasion
Hostile adjacent states
Weak adjacent states
Lack of defensible boundaries
Maintenance of the status quo

Maintenance of power distribution
Minor adjustments within existing power distribution
Causes for conflict

Reasons For Expansion of Power

Internal pressures--population, economic, ideological
Exploitation of a lack of power
Control of situations and events
Irrationality

THE CONTINUUM OF CONFLICT

There is no longer a distinct line between peace and war, instead there is a continuum of conflict with varying degrees of intensity. The need for flexibility and control become obvious.

The Nature of Modern Conflict

Protracted conflict
Conflict at the periphery of power
Use of surrogates
Effects of public opinion
Nuclear restraint

The Spectrum of Conflict

Forms of Conflict

Subversion, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, covert
armed forces, overt armed forces, formal war

Threats to National Survival

- Invasion
- Hostile adjacent states
- Weak adjacent states
- Lack of defensible boundaries

Maintenance of the Status Quo

- Maintenance of power distribution
- Minor adjustments within existing power distribution
- Causes for conflict

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The Spectrum of Conflict

Forms of Conflict

- Subversion, insurgency, guerrilla warfare, covert armed forces, overt armed forces, formal war

Tools and Weapons of Conflict

- Political
- Economic
- Cultural
- Military

THE NECESSITY FOR FORCE

There is an observable trend in military and political writings and discussions which implicitly assumes that nuclear war has been deterred and that large scale military force will not again be required

The Evidence of History and Events

- Historical experience
- Observable current events and their indications

The Origins of the Assumption

- The disparagement of power and military force
- Psychological rejection of possibility of nuclear war

Effects of the Assumptions

- Beneficial
- Harmful

THE USE OF POWER AND FORCE

The central issue in the use of power and force is the primacy of political purpose in the use of military force. Strategy must serve the nation's objectives if political purpose is to be served. The attainment of realistic objectives has supplanted "victory" as the goal of government during conflict.

The Primacy of Political Purpose

- Concept of civilian control
- Civilian authority and responsibility
- The military role
- The concept of victory

National Objectives and Military Strategy

- The primacy of national objectives
- The role of military strategy
- Analysis of the objective

THE NATURE AND ELEMENTS OF NATIONAL POWER

Power once created immediately begins to escape from control; it leads to consequences not planned. National power is at once concrete and indeterminant for it ultimately reflects the values and aspirations of a nation's people. The disparagement of power affects the use of power.

The Nature of Power

- Power and influence
- Power and force--ideological, political, economic
- Unusable and usable power

The Disparagement of National Power

- The roots of disparagement
- The effects of disparagement

The Elements of National Power

- Geographic, natural resources, industrial capacity, population, national character, national morale, quality of government, military preparedness

THE LIMITATIONS OF POWER AND FORCE

National power is limited by both internal and external factors. Force is always limited in its application.

APPENDIX II

THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF DAVID HALBERSTAM'S

THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST

The Limitations of National Power

Internal limitations--economic, national purpose,
character and morale
External limitations--existing distribution of world
power, world opinion

The Limitations of Force

Internal limitations--national consensus, available
power, weapons, character of armed forces
External limitations--world opinion, thermo-nuclear
threat, the new nationalism

THE RESOLUTION OF HOSTILITIES

The decreased likelihood of war being terminated by victory
and defeat places a new dimension of responsibility on both
civil and military authority.

The Conclusion of Hostilities

Civil authority--maintenance of communications with
the enemy, its sponsors, and allies
Military authority--maintenance of military pressure
during critical period of negotiation

International Control of Hostilities

Arms control
Disarmament
Peace Keeping Forces
Collective Security

APPENDIX II

THE MILITARY IMPLICATIONS OF DAVID HALBERSTAM'S THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST

Much has been written of how the United States became involved in Vietnam; political deceit and the erosion of morality in high places has been attributed to that involvement. In most of these writings the United States military leadership has been pictured as naive and blundering Colonel Blimps, or, on the other hand, as devious war-lovers who mislead civilian authority so as to be able to try-out new weapons and techniques of war on hapless peasants. A few tried to portray them as "a thin red line of heroes," but that had salability only among the military.

The truth of the matter was that they were none of these. The military leadership during Vietnam was honest, industrious, and reasonably competent. Yet, serious errors of judgement were made time and again.

Halberstam's The Best and the Brightest is acknowledged as the most comprehensive book yet published on our involvement in Vietnam. Halberstam deals with the question of the military establishment's role. He does so with apparent objectivity, scattering rose petals and bricks as the situation seems to demand. If there were more bricks than rose petals--well, that's the kind of war that it was.

The Best and the Brightest is a disquieting book, and doubly so for the military man. It not only raises issues which concern us as citizens but also brings into question tenets which we as military professionals have long accepted as hallmarks of our profession. Though the military establishment of the United States is not its principal audience, the book raises issues of vital military significance.

Indeed, to ignore the issues and their implications is to create doubt as to the continued effectiveness of our military effort to support national policy.

Consideration of these issues must be rigorous and intellectually honest. That is to say, one should not dismiss these issues because one disapproves of what Halberstam has to say. One should instead concentrate on the implications of the shortcomings which Halberstam attributes to the military.

Halberstam indirectly charges the military establishment with careerism and restrictive loyalty. He also questions the military's ability to control policy and to render sound judgment. Each of these relates directly to elements of this paper. This analysis is appended so as to present within the context of a single issue, Vietnam, many of the concepts which are fundamental to military theory.

Careerism

Explicit throughout the book is the concept that many officers are more concerned with advancing their own careers than with personal integrity and loyalty. In short, we are accused of careerism.

Halberstam attributes this distasteful practice to many senior officers, including a distinguished Marine, Lieutenant General Victor Krulak. Halberstam states his case forcefully in the following event.

The time is 1963; the place, Washington. Lieutenant Colonel John Paul Vann, USA, has just returned from Vietnam with a view of the war that differs from the generally optimistic view of the administration. On finding that MAAG, Vietnam, has ordered that he not be debriefed in Washington, Vann arranges to present his views to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Halberstam says that Vann:

...was also warned not to show his briefing until the last minute to General Krulak, who was the Secretary of Defense's special adviser on guerrilla warfare, and a person who was already surfacing as a man with a vested interest in the optimism, having just returned from a tour of Saigon and reported to the Chiefs that the war was going very well, every bit as well as Harkins said. (p.204)

Vann provides Krulak with a copy of his briefing some four hours before the meeting is scheduled with the JCS. At the last moment, Vann's briefing is cancelled.

Thus a major dissenting view was blocked from a hearing...This charade was a microcosm of the way the high level military destroyed dissenters...It confirmed to many...that a good deal of the reason for Harkins optimism

and its harshness on doubters was not just Harkin's doing. Rather, Harkins was a puppet controlled by Taylor...the messenger between them was General Krulak. (p. 204-205)

The inference is that General Krulak arranged the cancellation of the Vann briefing to keep from official view any opinions on the war which differed from those officially espoused by General's Taylor and Krulak.

Halberstam makes repeated references to careerism. Of General Krulak, he later says "...Krulak had participated in serious misrepresentations to the President." (p. 267) General Paul Harkins, Commander MAAGV, is described as "...a man of compelling mediocrity. He had mastered one thing...how to get along, how not to make a superior uncomfortable." (p. 183-184) Of Brigadier General Richard Stilwell, Halberstam says:

He became the hatchet man for Harkins, the man who personally quashed the reporting of the dissenting colonels, who challenged all dissenting views, who, though he was not in the intelligence operation, went through the intelligence reports, tidying them up. (p. 251)

Halberstam summarizes his contention:

Sound misreporting did not impede the careers of either Stilwell or Krulak...but it did offer a fascinating insight into the way the military worked. Loyalty was not to the President...to truth or integrity, or even to subordinate officers risking their lives; loyalty was to uniform and more specifically to immediate superior and career. (p. 280)

These charges rankle. The idea that one can achieve general officer rank by getting along and not making superiors uncomfortable is repugnant. The idea that a general officer would lie to

the President is anathema. The impulse to attack the charges against individuals must be resisted if the deeper issue of careerism is to be faced.

Careerism does exist in the Services. All but the most naive have seen it. But it is still an aberrant condition. The majority of officers are honorable men who meet their responsibilities to their country, their Service, and their conscience. It is incumbent upon us to weed out those who are careerist, lest Halberstam's summary someday apply in general.

Before proceeding, it should be stated that Halberstam can not be accused of being anti-military. Though he is plainly not an uncritical admirer of General Krulak, he does present many military men in a favorable light; John Paul Vann, General Shoup, General Ridgway, and various officers of lesser fame are presented as honorable, competent, and loyal. General Wallace M. Greene, though obviously holding different views on Vietnam than Halberstam, is singled out for particular praise. The important thing is that one should not reject the vital issues which Halberstam raises because one dislikes his treatment of individuals.

Restrictive Loyalty

The theme of restrictive loyalty is closely akin to careerism. But it is more insidious. It bequiles honorable men into dishonorable acts in the name of loyalty. The loyalty of the

military man is, in that splendid phrase of the Army, to duty, honor, and country. Restrictive loyalty is loyalty to an individual or organization at the expense of higher loyalties.

Halberstam speaks to restrictive loyalties:

In September, with the bureaucracy as divided as ever, Kennedy decided to try and get information from both Lodge and Harkins on a long list of specific questions. The request was very much the President's and he asked Hilsman to compose it. The Cable itself reflected a vast amount of doubt about the progress of the war. Eventually the answers from both men came in: the Lodge report was thoroughly pessimistic, while the Harkins report was markedly upbeat, filled with assurance, but also bewildering because it seemed to be based on the debate in Washington rather than the situation in Saigon. (p. 271)

Curious, White House aides checked with a "low ranking clerk" at the Pentagon and found a copy of a message from General Maxwell Taylor to General Harkins. It was:

...a remarkably revealing cable...explaining just how divided the bureaucracy was, what the struggle was about, saying that the Hilsman cable did not reflect what Kennedy wanted, that it was more Hilsmanish than Kennedyish, and then outlining which questions to answer and precisely how to answer them. (p. 271)

Halberstam comments:

The White House staff was very angry and felt that Taylor had been completely disloyal, although Kennedy himself was more fatalistic than upset, being perhaps more aware of the conflicting pulls on Taylor's loyalty. (p. 271)

Halberstam illustrates the intellectual corruption which follows restrictive loyalty.

In April 1965, MACV conducted an intelligence study of the North Vietnamese Army's capability to reinforce from the North.

The study had to do with the number of American troops General Westmoreland would request from Washington: The JCS was asking for three divisions to be sent to Vietnam; Westmoreland was asking for smaller units.

The report when completed showed that Hanoi had the capability of sending "astonishing" numbers of men down the trail without seriously weakening its defenses at home. Colonel William Crossen, presented the study to "a general" on the MACV staff:

...he looked at it and said that it was impossible. Not impossible at all, answered Crossen, checked and double-checked. "Jesus," said the General, "if we tell this to Washington we'll be out of the war tomorrow. We'll have to revise it downward." So Crossen's figures were duly scaled down considerably, which was a good example of how the Army system worked, the staff intuitively protecting the commander from things he didn't want to see and didn't want to hear, never coming up with information which might challenge what a commander wanted to do at a given moment. (p. 545)

Restrictive loyalty strikes at the heart of the military system, the integrity of command. There is little point to the development of sophisticated weapons systems, elaborate strategic plans, and the recruitment of quality personnel if we permit the eroding of our fundamental strengths, loyalty and trustworthiness. If behavior such as restrictive loyalty is allowed to continue, the Executive must without question reduce their expectations for the usefulness of our military effort.

Control of Policy

A policy once approved acquires a life and a momentum all its own. Control becomes critical as implementing plans set events in motion. Unless controls are rigorously maintained the original policy objectives may be obscured by the motion of events.

Halberstam seems to have recognized the necessity for control of policy when he says:

...the capacity to control a policy involving the military is greatest before the policy is initiated, but once started, no matter how small the initial step, a policy has a life and thrust of its own, it is an organic thing. More, its thrust and its drive may not be in any way akin to the desires of the President who initiated it. (p. 209)

A more discriminating reading suggests that Halberstam may have intended more than just control of policy. Emphasis on the modifying phrase, involving the military, leads one to believe that he was in fact calling for control of the military. This interpretation is borne out by the examples cited throughout the book. Halberstam returns time and again to what he considers to be the military's use of the foot-in-the-door technique in order to obtain more troops and gain permission to use particular weapons and techniques. Halberstam sees such actions as causing an inevitable widening of the war.

If Halberstam sees the problem as one of controlling the military as opposed to controlling policy, then he is viewing the problem in a limited context and has lost sight of the larger

implications. Control of policy is necessary at all levels of government. This point is vital and worthy of the most serious consideration. Unless the implementation of policy is rigorously controlled, the turmoil of events will obscure the objectives of policy and failure will result.

Success in the military effort to control the implementation of policy is contingent upon complete understanding of that policy and its objectives. Such understanding is extremely difficult to come by. National policy and objectives are rarely expressed in direct and tangible terms. How then are military leaders and planners to distinguish true objectives from slogans and ideology?

This process of understanding policy can be explained most succinctly by setting forth a series of terse questions which military leaders and planners should ask themselves when analyzing policy:*

What overall effect is desired from this policy?

What are all the objectives of this policy?

What are the minimum key objectives of this policy

*This should in no way be construed as advocating an abandonment of the traditional military-civil relationship. Civil leaders set policy. Military leaders implement policy. The only point that is being made is that the military can better implement policy when it understands all the nuances of that policy.

What are the assumptions on which this policy is based?

Are these assumptions valid?

Will the use of military force affect these assumptions?

How?

What minimum military action is required to achieve all the objectives of policy? The minimum key objectives?

What military objectives will best support attainment of policy objectives?

What forces will be set in motion by the proposed or contingent military action?

Will such forces contribute to or detract from the overall effect desired from this policy?

Will compensating measures be required to counter or offset such forces as are set in motion?

Will these compensating measures affect the assumptions, the objectives of policy, or the overall effect desired from this policy?

Finally, and of fundamental importance:

What constitutes satisfactory attainment of the minimum key objectives? **

** These questions are derived from the concept of Analysis of the Objective. This concept is examined in detail by the leading military theoretician of our time, Rear Admiral H. E. Eccles, USN, Ret., in his distinguished work, *Military Concepts and Philosophy* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965).

With the understanding of policy thus gained, military leaders and planners will be better able to control the structure, deployment, and use of military power and force so as to attain the objectives of policy.

Before leaving the subject of control it is important to return briefly to the contention that Halberstam's focus was really directed at controlling the military instead of the more important issue of control of policy. One might say with justification that the distinction is subtle within the context of Halberstam's usage. Subtle perhaps, but significant. Continued emphasis, however indirect, on controlling the military will over time lead to a robotistic military establishment comprised of military mechanics devoid of initiative and judgement.

Military judgement is already subject to a great deal of questioning. This is the implication of Halberstam's theme of controlling the military.

Military Judgement

Since Halberstam's book is not primarily concerned with military matters, one must draw some inferences based on examples cited and careful between-the-line readings. On such a basis, Halberstam's principal criticism of military judgement seems to be:

That military men tend to recommend military force as the solution to international difficulties.

That military men frequently fail to consider non-military factors when planning for and employing force.

The Best and the Brightest is replete with instances where military judgement failed to measure up. Present but far less numerous are examples where military judgement was exceptionally sound. One example will serve to illustrate both conditions.

In April 1954, the French attempt to force the Vietminh into a set-piece battle had gone sour. Dienbienphu was surrounded. Pressure was being exerted on Washington to prevent the defeat of the French. A controversy arose over intervention.

Within the Executive Branch, the Congress, and the JCS lines were drawn and positions taken. The President appeared ambivalent. Two military men played significant roles in the controversy: Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the JCS "eagerly" proposed intervention; General Matthew Ridgway, Army Chief of Staff opposed intervention. Halberstam's view of Radford:

...with the garrison trapped at Dienbienphu, Radford was ready; it was his first chance to test the New Look, and he was eager to go. One good solid air strike at the attackers, and that would do it. (p. 138)

At a meeting with Congressional leaders:

Radford made a strong and forceful presentation: the situation was perilous. If Indochina went, then Southeast Asia would go. We would be moved back to Hawaii. The Navy, he assured the senators was ready to go, two hundred planes were on the carriers Essex and Boxer.

The Senators began to question Radford. Would this be an act of war? Yes, we would be in the war. What would happen if the first air strike did not succeed in relieving the garrison? We would follow it up. What about ground forces? Radford gave an ambivalent answer. (p. 140)

The Army was not ambivalent:

Nor did the Army permit the White House the luxury of thinking that we could get by with only air power. Radford's plan for an airstrike was contingent on seizure of China's Hainan Island, which seemed to guard the Tonkin Gulf, because the Navy did not want to enter the gulf with its carriers and then have Chinese airbases right behind them. But if we captured Hainan, the Chinese would come across with everything they had; then it was not likely to remain a small war very long. (p. 143) (Emphasis added.)

Halberstam looks at the role Ridgway played:

Ridgway was very uneasy...Wars were settled on the ground, and on the ground the losses were always borne by his people, U.S. Army foot soldiers and Marines...So he sent an Army survey team to Indochina to determine the requirements for fighting a ground war there. What he wanted was the basic needs and logistics of it...

The answers were chilling: minimal, five divisions and up to ten if we wanted to clear out the enemy..., plus fifty-five engineering battalions, between 500,000 and 1,000,000 men, plus enormous construction costs. The country had nothing in the way of port facilities, railroads and highways, telephone lines. We would have to start virtually from scratch, at a tremendous cost...It was more than likely that in this political war the population would help the Vietminh...

Thus the Ridgway report, which no one had ordered...but Ridgway felt he owed it both to the men he commanded and the country he served. His conclusion was not that the United States should not intervene, but he outlined very specifically the heavy price required. (p. 143)

Nineteen years have passed since Admiral Radford and General Ridgway evaluated the Indochina situation and made their disparate recommendations to the President. In retrospect, the recommendations of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff appear ludicrous. The idea that airpower could have prevented 100,000

Vietminh from overrunning 13,000 French and Colonial troops is difficult enough to take seriously; to have considered "seizing" an island larger than the combined states of Massachusetts and Rhode Island on the very doorstep of China, as a preliminary step to intervention, is incomprehensible. Ridgway's report, on the other hand, has been proven sound by subsequent events.

What then of Halberstam's criticism? Are they valid? Or does the soundness of military judgement depend on the military man, as the example cited would seem to suggest? Let us consider each criticism in turn.

Do military men tend to recommend the use of force to solve international difficulties? Yes. Not always of course, but a sufficient number of times to justify describing it as a tendency. This should surprise one no more than finding out that a surgeon tends to recommend surgery. In times of crisis one tends towards actions with which one is familiar.

A better phrasing of the question would have been: why is there a tendency to always consider the use of force in any situation which seems to offer the opportunity to employ force?***

*** No attempt was made here to set up a strawman just so it could be knocked down. The question, why does the military always seem to recommend military action, seems frequently on the nib of Halberstam's pen. The question wants perspective, which is probably why he never asked it directly.

This tendency does not derive from any innate American bellicosity as the Litany of the Left would have us believe. It is more complicated than that.

The origins of this tendency are rooted in complex and interrelated factors.

The type of men who are elected and appointed to high public office, the decision makers, are canted towards action and the attainment of goals. Their power is ultimately based on rapid resolution of difficulties with minimum disruption of domestic conditions. Such men shun protracted discussion of crisis conditions. They turn from presentations which show problems to be multi-faceted and complex and seek instead the single-paced double-spaced summary which offers a quick solution. Above all such men are optimists; certain of their ability to control situations and events.

The nature of force is deceptive. It seems to offer quick and simple solutions to complex problems. Semantic distortions contribute to this deception. Terms such as "search and destroy", "interdiction", and "hunter-killer team" conjure up images of swift decisive action. The application of force is rarely so swift and decisive.

In a free society, continued exposure of a problem sets in motion intricate patterns of public reaction which inevitably results in demands for action.

These factors combine and react, one on the other. The result is that force is almost always considered during times of crisis. Considering the complex and pervasive nature of the factors involved, the wonder is that force is not resorted to more often. The fact that it is not is partially attributable to the caliber of men elected and appointed to public office.

The second inferred criticism of military judgement is that military men tend to ignore non-military factors. On first reading this seems as self-evident as the military tendency to recommend military action. After further consideration, it's not quite so simple.

One does not expect personnel of lower ranks to concern themselves with political, economic, and ideological matters involving the enemy they are fighting or preparing to fight. At some point, however, one indeed does expect our military leaders and planners to show a sophisticated awareness of all factors affecting the employment of force. As Professor Harold Hill was moved to remark, "You got to know the territory."

This awareness has to do with responsibility and how one perceives and reacts to responsibility. Responsibility increases with rank, but it is not a straight-line progression. There is a point at which one encounters new dimensions of responsibility: issues which once were peripheral become central; a more comprehensive view of events is required. One may argue about where this new dimension of responsibility is first

encountered, but it definitely exists at the level where military men analyze national policy and existing situations so as to advise the civilian members of the Executive and Legislative Branches. At that point where policy and events are analyzed and plans formulated, the military men must intuitively expand his outlook. His considerations cannot be limited to those which are strictly military in nature but must be expanded to include political, economic, and ideological factors as well.

The soundness of Ridgway's report was a result of his consideration of all the factors affecting the proposed employment of force; military, political, economic, and ideological factors were all evaluated.

Summary

We have now come to the end of one of the most traumatic periods of our nation's history. The war in Vietnam fragmented our society as nothing has done since our own Civil War. The resulting discord even penetrated into our military establishment.

The position taken by our government cannot be questioned by us, for we are professional military men. Our duty is clear; it is to serve. But that is not to say that we cannot learn from so searing an experience. Indeed, that too is part of our duty.

Here then is surely the worth of The Best and the Brightest it raises to prominence questions of significance. The military establishment of the United States must look to itself for the answers.

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